基督敎神學槪論 · Jeong Kyeong-ok Wroot Press · preview
現代基督敎思想의 一般傾向 · 1939 edition, pp. 108–126

Chapter 3. General Tendencies of Modern Christian Thought

(1) Rationalism and Mysticism

p. 108 The general characteristic of modern religious thought lies in its reaction against intellectualism.1 Yet over the past several centuries, when Christianity came into contact with the new intellectual environment created by the development of science and the reconstruction of philosophy that followed the rise2 of Enlightenment thought, it could not take an attitude of indifference.3 The rationalism of the eighteenth century was the first great expression that the modern spirit4 found in the realm of religion.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century revolted against the constraint of a tradition resting on every kind of external authority. It maintained that the standard of truth lies not in the decisions of the church or in inherited doctrine but in human rational judgment, and it demanded religious toleration and p. 109 freedom. This came about because, on the one hand, the church's authority had collapsed through religious disputes, and, on the other, confidence in human reason had grown with the advance of learning; and the ascendancy of the modern spirit sent grave ripples through traditional theology. When, at the end of the seventeenth century, the English church stood apart from the Roman Catholic Church and had Parliament pass the "Act of Toleration," this meant the victory of Protestantism and of its fundamental spirit.5 But the Protestant Reformation was in origin medieval in its spirit and content, and as conservative as the Roman Catholic Church, so that the authority of reason and the recognition of freedom bore a destructive character even within the Protestantism of the time.

Second, their rationalism strove to reconcile reason and revelation. John Tillotson6 opposed such things as the passion of mysticism or the intuitive faculty7 of the "Cambridge Platonists,"8 and maintained that religious truth must be established by rational proof. They also thought that revelation supplies what is lacking in natural religion9 and establishes the duties of natural religion. Revelation, therefore, must not contradict the principles of natural religion, and there must be sure grounds for regarding it as revelation. John Locke said that God's revelation may indeed give knowledge that our reason can also obtain, but that in such a case revelation is not only unnecessary: truth we have discovered by reflecting on our own ideas is even more certain than truth resting on traditional revelation. Yet he insisted that the knowledge of our reason alone is incomplete and that a revelation above reason is needed, and he said that revelation in turn can be judged true or false by reason.10

p. 110 Third, the rationalism of the eighteenth century on the whole emphasized that human beings have moral ability, and maintained that the fundamental purpose of religion lies in the moral life. Matthew Tindal said that the difference between religion and morality11 is that the former consists in acting according to the reason of things regarded as the will of God, and the latter in acting according to the reason of things as conceived in itself.12 Kant says that religion is recognizing one's own duties as the commands of God.13

Mysticism is one of the most distinctive currents among the many kinds of modern religious thought. What Herman said in The Meaning and Value of Mysticism, "The characteristic of modern religious thought lies in the revival of mysticism," is probably an observation close to the facts. (Herman, A., The Meaning and Value of Wysticism[sic] p. 2)14 It is a fact that in our time many people of religious spirit and zeal, dissatisfied with complicated theories and with institutions that drift into formalism, have turned their interest to religious mysticism.

Mysticism, first, makes immediate experience its chief concern. Immediate experience,15 according to mysticism, does not necessarily mean feeling or intuition. In mystical experience there are feeling and intuition, and at the same time the working of the intellect, and moral activity goes with it. Immediate experience might also be called, as a certain scholar has put it, the gaining of "knowledge by acquaintance."16 We are not satisfied with the descriptive knowledge of some object that observation gives us; only when we form a living relation with the object itself and can take a sympathetic attitude toward it does an inner observation of that object become possible.

Second, mysticism opposes materialist thought and formalism and longs for the spiritual, inner world. Mysticism believes that p. 111 the ideal kingdom is where our spiritual true self is realized. We are for the most part the products of our environment and subject to its control. When hardship bears down on me, my footing shakes; at times I curse the world, and at times I struggle to flatter the circumstances around me. But mysticism teaches that, though the environment changes and the surroundings shift, one builds an eternal house on the rock of the spirit,17 becomes master of one's own spirit, and rules over environment and selfish desire. Mystics therefore commonly despise the material world. If matter and the body become obstacles blocking the way to the ultimate purpose of the inner life, they do not hesitate even to curse matter and flesh. Especially now, when modern material civilization has developed to the extreme and everything has been made into an institution, so that even religion is in some quarters regarded as a means of satisfying our acquisitiveness, and doctrine and ritual alone, like the disguise of a corpse, are noisily dressed up apart from real life, a mystical reaction of this kind arises of necessity.

Lastly, religious mysticism strives above all to be conscious of the presence of God. What is commonly called "divine intoxication" is just this. Of course, the idea of God that mystics hold differs according to their environment, education and influences. In primitive religion, when people made the drinking of spirits or herbs and wild rhythmic dancing their means of reaching the gods, or else sought to enter a state of ecstasy18 through long fasting, self-restraint and austerities, their idea of God too was little more definite than the primitive idea of "mana." But the more religious thought develops,19 people come to regard natural objects as objects of worship and to believe that in God all the phenomena of the universe attain unity. Going on from here, p. 112 when the God we worship comes to have personality, we come to share joys, sorrows and purposes with him and to form a sympathetic friendship.

Christian mysticism has its first sprouts in the thought of Paul and John. The mystical thought of Paul and John was not wholly their own invention; it is a fact that it took up forms of thought current in their time. Yet such things as the meeting of the "Logos" and "Wisdom" in John, or Paul's "Christ-mysticism,"20 cannot but be said to have come from their own deep inner lived experience.21

The religious thought of the early church was, broadly speaking, considerably influenced by "Neoplatonic philosophy," and the Christianity it interpreted has a strong tendency toward "Platonic mysticism."

In the Middle Ages the foundation of so-called "complete mysticism" was laid, and Christianity became mystical in the extreme. To name the mystics of this period: Hugh of St. Victor (Hugo of St. Victar[sic], 1097—1141), Bernard of Clairvaux (Bernard of Clarvaux[sic] 1091—1153), St. Francis of Assisi (Francis of Assisi, 1182—1226 Catherine of Genoa (Catherine of Genoa 1347—1380), St. John of the Cross (St. John of Crass[sic], 1542—1591), Santa Teresa (Santa Therasa[sic], 1515—1582), Madame Guyon (Mme Guyou[sic], 1648—1717), and others. (Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystic Religion, Macmillan, see)22

After the eighteenth century, when German Protestantism had sunk into decline, the "longing for piety" arose around Philipp Jakob Spener and stirred up the religious spirit.23 They held that the value of faith is decided wholly by its practical effects; they despised the theoretical side of religion and, demanding the simplest and freest faith, stressed p. 113 the piety of the individual. They centered on the doctrine of saving faith, which bears directly on the religious life, and insisted that we must be united with Christ in life and undergo a change of personality.

In modern times the study of mysticism within Christianity has grown still more intense. To introduce the chief literature on modern mysticism: first there is Professor Dean Inge's Christian Mysticism. (Dean Inge, Christian Mysticism, 1899)24 Professor Inge maintains that "Platonic philosophy" is the heart of Christian mysticism. This is the opposite view to Wilhelm Herrmann's On Mysticism (Herrmann, Wm., The Communion of Christian with God), which declares that "Platonic mysticism" runs counter to the fundamental spirit of Christianity;25 but it cannot but be called the representative work in the study of Christian mysticism. On the philosophical side there are26 Professor Hocking's God as He Appears in Human Experience and A Philosophical Study of Mysticism by Bennett, one of his students (Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience; Bennett, Philosophical Study of Mysticism);27 and on the practical side the most distinguished are Jones's Studies in Mystical Religion (1909), The Spiritual Revivalists of the Sixteenth Century (1914) and A Reconsideration of Mystical Religion (1927).28 Jones's longing for the spiritual life and his appraisal of it have given a great impetus to a world of modern religious thought that is drunk on science and bound by institutions. According to him, mystical experience is religion in its keenest, most intense and most living state (Studies in Mystical Religion, Introduction, p. 15), and "mysticism is the assertion of a life in which, as an inner power, the invisible spirit p. 114 transcends this apparent and temporary world and conquers the causal and mechanical world" (ibid., p. 22).29 Herman's The Meaning and Value of Mysticism opposed modern pragmatism and psychologism and set out clearly the essentials of religious mysticism. Philosophy forms the historical background of the religious life, and true religion rests on pure mystical experience: this is her main point. Besides these, the works most worth noting are such books as Underhill's The Way of Mysticism and The Essence of Mysticism, or von Hügel's The Philosophy of Mysticism and The Transcendent God of Mysticism.30

(2) Fundamentalism and Modernism

At the end of the nineteenth century the theological thought of Europe and America was commonly ranged in the two opposing camps of fundamentalism and modernism.31

Fundamentalism rests in origin on institutions or on doctrinal ideas. The fundamentalism of Roman Catholicism lays its weight on the church and on the privilege of a clergy ordained by apostolic succession; the fundamentalism of Protestantism rests on doctrine and the Bible. But in their fundamental spirit the two do not differ.

Fundamentalism believes that Christianity is a supernatural revelation. That is, Christianity is a truth long hidden, revealed to humanity once only, as a fact without precedent or sequel, through a special organ of God, at a certain fixed time and in a certain fixed place; and it has been kept without any change or loss. According to the Catholic Church the church is the repository of revelation; according to Protestantism the Bible is the repository of truth. Revelation happens once for all. The method of revelation is mechanical, and the essence of revelation is fixed. Included here are: the belief in human depravity, which holds that natural human reason cannot grasp religious truth; the intellectualist view that becoming a Christian means accepting wholly the content of revelation kept in the church or the Bible; and the historicism that holds fast to one particular tradition of Christianity as the "orthodox" thought of p. 115 Christianity. At times, in maintaining that the reason one must believe such a simple, concrete and supra-rational revelation unconditionally32 lies in stirring up the common people to practise their moral duties, it is not free of a tendency to treat orthodoxy as a means to an end.

Modernism is also called the "New Theology." The term "New Theology" was first used by Professor Mackintosh to name the "Ritschlian school";33 afterwards its meaning gradually changed until it came to denote new teachings opposed to Christian tradition. Various adjectives were then attached to it, so that it was called "liberal theology," "modern theology" or "progressive theology," and the fundamentalists loathed it.

First, modernism holds that in order to approach religious facts with an unprejudiced attitude, and to search for and pursue true religious truth, we may use all modern knowledge: that is, the knowledge that natural science, history, psychology, sociology, philosophy, ethics, literature or aesthetics gives us. Modernism does not hold, as the English natural theologians of the eighteenth century did, that religious truth can be grasped only by the method of natural science. It accepts the view that human reason has the capacity to grasp religious truth, and that the most complete knowledge human beings achieve, if there is such a thing, will not contradict or oppose religious faith.

Second, modernism believes in the continuous development of life, and believes that religion, being one aspect of life, is likewise not fixed but must be dynamic. Religion must rest on divine authority. Therefore true religious truth is always p. 116 revelation, and the claim to true revelation is always orthodox. But the religious experience manifested in human experience cannot at any time be called flawless. Modernists therefore believe that God's revelation has appeared gradually, following the historical development of humanity and the changes of cultural life.

Third, modernism is said to have a tendency34 to interpret the Bible and doctrine symbolically. It treated accounts that reason finds hard to settle as figures or parables, and maintained that the forms of religion are the artistic expression of the real in Christian experience.35

(3) Humanism and Barthian Theology

If there is anything today that, from a religious standpoint, praises twentieth-century civilization wholeheartedly, it is humanism. The so-called "new humanism" of recent times seeks to idealize the spirit of modern civilization just as it is, and to make a religion of it.

But humanism is by no means something the twentieth century created for the first time. It has far too long a history to be called a product of modern times. Of course, the so-called "new humanism" or "atheistic humanism" of the present day differs somewhat in its details from the humanism of old; but if we would understand the fundamental meaning of "new humanism" thoroughly even now, there is no better way than to examine the historical forms in which humanism has developed.

In the fifth century before Christ, in Greece, the humanist movement of some of the "Sophists," who set themselves against "natural philosophy,"36 p. 117 stood out with a distinctive brilliance in the history of Western philosophy. Before this, philosophy had meant a broad, speculative philosophy that sought out the fundamental elements of matter,37 searched for eternal laws in this ever-changing world of phenomena, and pursued a universe of order and system in a world of multiplicity and chaos. But some philosophers grew weary of such broad theories and came to see them as the pastime of people with leisure, fruitless dreams and nothing more. Here they discovered a new field for philosophy, and this new field was the world of humanity. We must take as our object the human being itself, which we ourselves know well and must know in practical living, and bring philosophical evaluation and reflection to bear on it. When Socrates cried, "Know thyself,"38 it was a revolutionary word in the thought of his time.

Afterwards, in the history of Western thought, the thought of Jesus and the religious movement that arose from it gave rise to a humanitarianism in the soundest sense. But the long shadow of the darkness of the Middle Ages kept human beings from recognizing their true value or bringing it to light. Then39 came the age of the Renaissance, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The spirit of the "Renaissance"40 resisted the church institutions of the Middle Ages and the tyrannical oppression of the popes, and asserted human freedom. Feudalism was broken and a new nationalism arose; the knowledge of science conquered nature more with every passing day; a new continent was discovered, and with new hope the drive to build an ideal temple for humanity rose to the heavens. Here people opposed the traditional doctrines of the church and insisted that every human being must have the right and the opportunity to enjoy the joy of life to the fullest.

p. 118 The most distinctive humanist movement that arose in eighteenth-century France was the work of the Encyclopedists.41 They pointed out that the institutions of the Roman Catholic Church had become utterly corrupt, attacked the church for defending a social order contrary to justice, on the whole rejected the church's traditional theology, and for the most part professed atheism. But their atheism rested on no philosophical ground; it was an atheism meant to stress the reform of society and the value and possibilities of human beings.

If we want to understand the "new humanism" that has arisen recently, with America as its centre, we must first examine the theory of religion that rests on the positivism of Auguste Comte.42 Of course, Comte's positivism and present-day "humanism" have come to differ not a little in the form and content of their thought, according to the differences of place, time and circumstance in which their systems were formed. But whether we look at their attempt to apply the methods and principles of modern science to religion just as they are, or at their insistence on the social nature of religion and the need for social adjustment, or at the value they set on the concrete facts of real life above theory, there is no essential difference between them.

Seen theologically, the "new humanism" does not have a long history. The so-called "new humanism" arose comparatively recently. The first use of the term was probably Pringle-Pattison's, when in 1938 he wrote The Place of Humanity in the Universe (Man's Place in the Cosmos) and spoke of an "anthropocentrism" set against naturalism.43 Later the Englishman Schiller spoke of "humanism" as one variety of pragmatism.44

p. 119 Recently Christianity has tended to stress the social nature of religion and its social adaptability, and has made much of the need for the so-called "social gospel." Walter Rauschenbusch's The Theory of the Social Gospel, Christianity and the Social Crisis and The Social Teaching of Jesus,45 and Harry Ward's The Bible and Social Life, Religion and Democracy and The Social Creed of the Churches,46 have already become classics of religious literature, and yet they are still fresh in our memory.

But here we must distinguish cultural humanism from theological humanism. Theological humanism on the one hand rejects traditional religious thought, and on the other holds in check47 the anti-religious thought and movements that run to extremes. It is, so to speak, the proposal of a peculiar new religion that could be called half philosophy, half religion, half social science.

Religion believes that within this universe there is a world of reality that transcends the universe, and is convinced that human beings and human living must enter into a vital relation with this reality.48 But no one in religion can boast of having known the whole of this reality completely. Everyone, as a religious person, strives with a faithful and humble heart to know reality a little more clearly and to enter into a closer relation with it. Therefore we must know the world of reality. The task that the religious person has taken on is not so much the question whether the existence of God is an absolutely necessary premise of religion, as the question what kind of God we can believe in. Two answers have been proposed to this question. One is that God first reveals himself by his own act of self-giving; the other is that human reason can know the reality and the essence of God. But the new humanism opposes both proposals. They p. 120 hold fast to the naturalist position that no knowledge is valid unless it is knowledge based on the methods and results of modern natural science, and toward the older ideas of a philosophical absolute, and the notions of revelation and miracle that go with them, they take an attitude of doubt or agnosticism.

"The science of religion begins from phenomena we already know, that is, from the religious experience of human beings, and inquires49 into regions not yet known. The new science of religion admits that God is not yet known to us. In fact, when we first set out to begin a science of religion, we must be skeptical about the problem of God."

These are the words of Potter, a "Unitarian" minister, on the first page of his book Humanism.50 He goes on to say this:

"The humanist, in this age of science, can take no path but a logical position. So we are skeptics about God. We do not say that there is a God, nor do we say that there is no God. We say only that we cannot know God." (Potter, C. F., Humanism, p. 8)

In other words, rather than making the skeptical position the starting point of inquiry, as the method of a science of religion, he suggests that even with God left in doubt some kind of faith is possible and religion can stand.

But Professor Ames distinguishes "God" from "the God of religion." Toward "God," that is, the philosophical absolute, one may take an attitude of doubt or p. 121 refusal; but "the God of religion" can have its true nature laid bare by scientific analysis.51 Professor Ames says that "the God of religion," whom people have believed in and experienced in religion to this day, can be found in the universality of the values drawn from human experience.

"God is the spirit of the world in which living real beings live, drawn out of social and ideal experience. God is the stage of life's activity and includes the so-called material world that is the condition of existence; God also means life, intellect and action. God is the vast whole that is the process of life, within which life lives and moves and has its being. Here human beings must lead the most fitting life. Here they sing of it in praise, worship it in ritual, and gain in spirit the consciousness of an ideal fellowship. God is the world idealized and personified by the deepest and most spiritual effort of insight." (Ams[sic], E,S., Religion, p. 124)52

For this reason religion, in the end, is centred on making human life more complete. The human duty lies in this world. They say that the fundamental purpose of religion is to make this world a place fit to live in and to create an environment in which a more complete life can be enjoyed. So religion has no leisure to wrestle with broad metaphysical problems. Perhaps an answer to these problems may be found some day; and even if none is found, it is no concern of religion. The task of religion is to bring stability to life. Human beings always seek food to eat, look for a safe dwelling that shelters them from wind and rain, and strive to preserve the peace and harmony of the group. They seek freedom of the will and long for peace p. 122 of mind.53 "In this world there are many troubles and sorrows that human power cannot overcome; yet birth and the grave, an eternal sea, changing human life, glowing life: so, on the loom of time, the living garment of God is being woven."54 When at times the established institutions and ideas fail to give full satisfaction to the ideals of life, we reject the whole past and set out to open a new path. In the arena of life human beings thus laugh together, rejoice together, comfort one another and learn from one another. To enjoy the joy of life in this way is the privilege of human life. What is religion? The forms of religion vary with the circumstances of the age, but their fundamental purpose comes down to one thing: how55 we may live a little better. No age has been better fitted or more pressed to achieve this purpose than the present. We have scientific knowledge that the people of old did not possess. We have abundant goods. We have efficient machines. We have rapid means of transport. We have the experience of humanity in the past. Here we need a religion that will be praise, encouragement and power for life. The mission of religion is to strive for the highest development of life. So the new humanism maintains.

Therefore they think that religion can be changed at any time to suit people's convenience, so that it may bring us as much benefit as possible. Haydon's The Question of the Age (The Quest of the Ages)56 points out that religion has changed with historical structures, and maintains that religious action arose as the impulse of life took forms suited to each age. In other words, he does not try to judge the essence and validity of human desire itself by religion; he accepts desire as something prior to religion, and then treats religion as a means of attaining this desire. The "new humanism" never parts from the idea of a religion that brings benefit. They p. 123 commonly use such phrases as "a religion of the age" or "a social religion." The phrase "a religion of the age" means that religion, being a product of its age, must conform to the demands of its age. The phrase "a social religion" means that religion, being one form of the social spirit, must contribute in substance to the welfare of society. Here the American brand of utilitarianism is at work. The new humanism is, so to speak, a religious instrumentalism.

The new humanism has exalted the value of humanity and the glory of life. But on the other side it has come to abandon the most important teaching that the Christian tradition seeks to impart: it does not know the lived experience of regeneration,57 which comes with a life of trust and awe, and with gratitude and wonder at the grace of redemption.

The new humanism rests on the practical philosophy of naturalism and bears a pragmatist tendency. But here they have fallen into a theoretical impasse no less than that of the absolutism they curse. As Knudson has said, they hold a "cuttlefish philosophy." The new humanism, it is said, "like the cuttlefish that squirts black ink when it meets an enemy and hides itself," tries to hide its true nature in a fog of words.58

The theological current that collides head-on with the new humanism is "Barthian theology." "Barthian theology" is giving a great impetus to the religious thought of the world today.

Barth and his disciple Brunner were strongly influenced by "Kantian philosophy." The naturalism of the seventeenth century took an interest in the independent existence of external things and their mechanical laws. The empiricism of the eighteenth century doubted that the reality of things-in-themselves59 in the external world could be known, p. 124 and attended to impressions and ideas, which are the content of our experience. At this point Kant, stirred by British empiricism,60 examined the process by which knowledge is acquired, and made clear the unknowable thing-in-itself and the determination of meaning by forms of thought prior to experience and by ideas of value. Barth adopted Kant's dualism in the strict sense, opposed the monism of idealism, and sought to argue for this by a revision of Hegel's dialectic. Hegel's stages of dialectical development have a continuity that cannot be cut.

But Barth finds the moment of truth in the absolute origin that is the background of conflict before thesis and antithesis are synthesized. So, according to Barth, God is a transcendent Creator unknown to us. At the pure origin of all our being and action, God is "the wholly other,"61 distinct in kind from everything human and all that is human. Therefore he rejects the rationalist orthodox theology that equates the knowledge of God with other human knowledge, makes God one object of knowledge, and tries to prove faith by theory; and he says that God's meaning cannot be known except by revelation through God's own act of self-giving.

Barth's dualistic opposition of God and humanity seeks to bring even the place and value of humanity back to the evangelical view. Barth is a man who felt most keenly the finitude and sinfulness of human life. He saw the ivory tower of modern civilization shattered mercilessly by the European War, and realized how small and fleeting the works of human beings are. Dostoevsky's view of human life and Kierkegaard's philosophy stirred him with a strange fascination.62

p. 125 Here he came to know the world of grace more deeply than anyone. "The Word of God comes to humanity as reconciler, demands humility, and reveals itself as the authority that gives the gift of love." "In this world of grace the Holy Spirit, as reconciler, contends against the rebellion in the human spirit and the righteousness of works, that is, against the sin that no thought or deed can remove, and by the Spirit brings it forth as the fruit of faith, joy and certainty." So he said.63

Since, as has been said, the transcendent God grants redeeming grace through God's own self-revelation, what is humanity to do in its place of responsibility? Here Barth follows again the line of thought of Paul, Luther and Herrmann.64 Faith, according to him, is "a will that fills an empty space, a leaping decision that goes out toward the void."65 This leaves behind the subjective view that interprets faith as a human intellectual process, or takes it as dogmatic assent to fixed creeds, and seeks to understand it as a purely passive response to God's grace. "Faith, seen in its substance, is knowledge and recognition; it is the affirming of the word that God has spoken to me; it is the act by which I receive it and make it my own." But in its essence, he says, faith is "the human answer to the Word of God in the vital moment," a gift of the grace of God, who calls us and at the same time gives us the power to answer.66

Barthian theology fulfilled the mission of its age in rescuing religion from subjective relativism. It stressed that what is needed above all is to reach out beyond the self, to entrust the self to God, and to have a reverent spirit. But Barthian p. 126 theology, in recognizing a qualitative difference between God and humanity, created a theoretical impasse in which it could hardly avoid falling into agnosticism; and to overcome this impasse it could only repeat the theory of mechanical revelation as it stood.67

Notes

  1. The chapter has three sections: rationalism and mysticism (p. 108), fundamentalism and modernism (p. 114), and humanism and Barthian theology (p. 116). The only works Jeong names are the English books on mysticism of pp. 110–114. The scheme itself, from eighteenth-century rationalism through Tillotson, Locke, Tindal and Kant to the modern study of mysticism, reads like a condensed Anglo-American survey [Rall?]. 主知主義 is "intellectualism," as in Part One, ch. 4. ↩
  2. 進興 "rise," as printed (進 is clear). The usual compound is 振興 "promotion, revival"; 進興 "advance and rise" makes sense and is left unmarked. ↩
  3. 吾不關然의 態度 "an attitude of indifference." The idiom is usually written 吾不關焉 "it is no concern of mine"; the print has 然 clearly. The sense is not affected, and the form is left unmarked. ↩
  4. 近代的精神 "the modern spirit." 精神 holds together "spirit" and "mind" (German Geist); here and in 根本精神 "fundamental spirit" (p. 109), 宗敎的精神 "religious spirit" (pp. 110, 112) and 내 精神의 主人公 "master of one's own spirit" (p. 111) the English takes "spirit." In the last, "mind" would serve as well. ↩
  5. The English break with Rome came with the Act of Supremacy (1534); the Toleration Act (1689), Jeong's 宗敎寬容條令, granted freedom of worship to Protestant dissenters and excluded Catholics and anti-Trinitarians. Jeong sets both at the close of the seventeenth century. ↩
  6. 「짠·틸레쓴」 is John Tillotson (1630–1694), Archbishop of Canterbury from 1691, a Latitudinarian and a known opponent of religious "enthusiasm." He is usually placed near the Cambridge Platonists rather than against them; the contrast is Jeong's or his source's [Rall?]. ↩
  7. 直觀器能 "intuitive faculty." 器能 (capacity, talent) is a real word, used here where 機能 "faculty, function" is more usual; it is left unmarked. ↩
  8. 「캠부리지플레토니슴」 "Cambridge Platonism," the circle of Benjamin Whichcote, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. The print ends the word in 슴, with a single ㅅ, where Jeong's other -ism names end in 씀 (「플래토닉·미스티시씀」, p. 113). ↩
  9. 自然宗敎 "natural religion," in the deists' sense: the religion reason can reach unaided. It is kept apart from 自然神敎 "nature religion" (Part Two, ch. 2). ↩
  10. 「짠·락」 is John Locke. The paragraph follows An Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.xviii–xix: revelation may teach truths reason can also reach, but "whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation" (IV.xviii.4); things "above reason" are the proper matter of faith (IV.xviii.7); and "reason must be our last judge and guide in everything" (IV.xix.14). The translation follows Jeong's Korean. ↩
  11. 宗敎과[sic] "religion and," for 宗敎와: after the vowel-final 敎 the particle should be 와. It is the mirror of the 를-for-을 slip (III.2 n. 12). ↩
  12. 「틴델」 is Matthew Tindal (1657–1733), Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730). His formula runs, in substance: morality is acting according to the reason of things considered in themselves; religion is acting according to the same reason of things considered as the will of God. Jeong's 條理 is translated "the reason of things" to match. ↩
  13. Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, Part Four, Part One: "Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands"; also Critique of Practical Reason 5:129. ↩
  14. 「허멘」 is Emily Herman (1876–1923), The Meaning and Value of Mysticism (1915). Jeong gives the initial as "A." and prints "Wysticism" for "Mysticism"; the citation is reproduced as printed. Jeong writes 氏 of her as of any author. The quotation from p. 2 is translated from Jeong's Korean; Herman's English wording has not been checked. ↩
  15. 直接的驗經[sic] "immediate experience," for 直接的經驗: the two characters of 經驗 are set in reverse order. The same column prints 直接的經驗 correctly a few characters above. ↩
  16. 「親知의 知識」 "knowledge by acquaintance," set against 叙述의 知識 "descriptive knowledge" in the next sentence. The pair is Bertrand Russell's, "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" (1910–11; The Problems of Philosophy, 1912, ch. 5), after William James's "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge about" (Principles of Psychology, 1890, ch. 8). Jeong's "a certain scholar" is probably one of the two. ↩
  17. 靈의 磐石 위에 永遠한 집을 짓고 "builds an eternal house on the rock of the spirit" echoes the house built on the rock, Matthew 7:24–25. ↩
  18. 恍惚情態 "a state of ecstasy." 情態 (condition, state of feeling) is a real word, where 狀態 "state" is usual; it is left unmarked. ↩
  19. 할쑤록 "the more …," a period spelling of 할수록 that writes the tensed consonant. It is kept without mark. ↩
  20. 「그리스토、미스티시씀」 "Christ-mysticism," Adolf Deissmann's term (Christusmystik) for Paul's being "in Christ." The print sets 、 between the two words, inside the brackets, and spells the first 그리스토 (from the English "Christ"), not the usual 그리스도. The "Logos" and "Wisdom" of John are the Word of John 1 and the figure of Wisdom in Proverbs 8 and the Wisdom of Solomon. ↩
  21. 內的體驗 "inner lived experience." Jeong keeps 體驗 (Erlebnis) apart from 經驗 "experience," which he uses for 直接的經驗 "immediate experience," 神秘的經驗 "mystical experience" and 宗敎經驗 "religious experience" (pp. 110–116). ↩
  22. The names, from Rufus M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (Macmillan, 1909), which Jeong cites as "Studies in Mystic Religion." 「聖빙타의유고」 is Hugh of St. Victor (Hangul 빙타 for Victor); the English forms Victar, Clarvaux, Crass, Therasa and Guyou are printed so, and "1182—1226" has no closing parenthesis. 「제노아의캐터린」 is Catherine of Genoa (1447–1510), but the dates given, 1347–1380, are those of Catherine of Siena. 「쎈타떠라사」 is Teresa of Ávila; 「앰구욘」 is Jeanne Guyon ("Madame Guyon"). Jeong's 叅照 "see" is translated. ↩
  23. 「敬虔의 渴仰」 "the longing for piety" renders the title of Philipp Jakob Spener's Pia Desideria (1675), the founding document of German Pietism. Jeong's "after the eighteenth century" places it about a generation late. ↩
  24. 「띤·잉」 is William Ralph Inge (1860–1954), Dean of St Paul's from 1911, whose title Jeong treats as part of his name. Christian Mysticism was his Bampton Lectures of 1899. ↩
  25. 윌리암·헤얼만 is Wilhelm Herrmann (1846–1922), whose Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott (1886) appeared in English as The Communion of the Christian with God (1895); Jeong prints the English title without "the," and gives it the Korean title 「神秘論」 "On Mysticism." Herrmann argued that mysticism, which seeks God apart from the historical Christ, is not Christian. The name is not bracketed in the print. ↩
  26. "There are": the print has 었[?]고, a smeared syllable whose ㅇ is joined to the stem by a leftward stroke, so ㅓ rather than ㅣ. The sense wants 있고 "there are, and," or 있었고 "there were, and"; the first is translated. ↩
  27. William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (1912), Jeong's 「人間經驗에 나타난 하느님」 "God as He Appears in Human Experience" (「하킹」; Part Two, ch. 3 prints 「학킹」); Charles A. Bennett, A Philosophical Study of Mysticism (1923), 「뻬네트」. That Bennett was Hocking's student is Jeong's statement. ↩
  28. Rufus M. Jones (1863–1948), the American Quaker, 「쫀쓰」: Studies in Mystical Religion (1909), Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries (1914) and New Studies in Mystical Religion (1927). The translation gives Jeong's Korean titles. ↩
  29. The first reference is Jones's introduction, p. xv, where mysticism is "the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense and living stage." (The same page lies behind "the presence of God," p. 111.) The quotation from p. xxii, translated from Jeong's Korean, opens with 「 and is never closed; the English closes it at the end of the sentence. ↩
  30. Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941), 「언더힐」: The Mystic Way (1913) and The Essentials of Mysticism (1920), Jeong's 「神秘의道」 and 「神秘主義의眞髓」. Friedrich von Hügel (1852–1925), 「반휴겔」: 「神秘主義의 哲學」 is probably The Mystical Element of Religion (1908); 「神秘主義의 超然神」 "The Transcendent God of Mysticism" is not identified. ↩
  31. 根本主義 "fundamentalism," 現代主義 "modernism." The name "fundamentalist" dates from 1920, after the pamphlets The Fundamentals (1910–15); Jeong projects the two camps back to the end of the nineteenth century. ↩
  32. 無條件하고 "unconditionally," as printed, a verbal form where 無條件으로 or 無條件하게 would be usual. It is left unmarked. ↩
  33. 「매킨토쉬」 is not identified with certainty. Hugh Ross Mackintosh (1870–1936) and Robert Mackintosh (1858–1933), author of Albrecht Ritschl and His School (1915), both wrote on the Ritschlians. The claim about the origin of the term "New Theology" is Jeong's or his source's [Rall?]. 「으릇쉘學派」 "the Ritschlian school," in Jeong's spelling 으릇쉘. ↩
  34. 傾向를[sic] "a tendency," for 傾向을: 를 after the consonant-final 向 is a compositor's slip (cf. III.2 n. 12). ↩
  35. 基督敎經驗의 實在의 藝術的表現 "the artistic expression of the real in Christian experience." 實在 takes "the real," as elsewhere in the book: the realm or quality, not a single being. ↩
  36. 「自然哲學에 "against 'natural philosophy'": the bracket opened here is never closed in print; the English closes it at the end of the phrase. The natural philosophers are the Presocratics; the Sophists (「소피스트」; ch. 3 「쏘피스트」) are the fifth-century teachers such as Protagoras, for whom "man is the measure of all things." ↩
  37. Between 物質의 "of matter" and 根本原素 "fundamental elements" the print has a ragged hatched block, one character high, in the place of a word space. The sentence is complete without it: the block is a turned sort, or spacing material that rose and took ink. It is transcribed 〓, as on p. 99 (III.1 n. 29). ↩
  38. 「너를 알라」 "Know thyself," the Delphic maxim (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) that Socrates made his own (Plato, Phaedrus 229e, Charmides 164d). Jeong spells Socrates 「쏘크라티스」, as in III.2. ↩
  39. 그리다가 "then," as printed, for 그러다가; kept as a period or dialect form. On the same page 갈쑤록 "the more … the more" (cf. n. 19). ↩
  40. 「으레니산스」 "Renaissance," with the 으 that Jeong writes for a word-initial R (as in 「으릇첼」, Ritschl). 國家主義 "nationalism" means here the rise of the national states. ↩
  41. 百科全書派 "the Encyclopedists": Diderot, d'Alembert and the contributors to the Encyclopédie (1751–72). 顯殊 "distinctive" is Jeong's word (II.2 n. 15). 正義 is "justice" here; the Korean word also holds "righteousness." ↩
  42. Auguste Comte (1798–1857), 「오거스트·콘트」, whose positivism (實證主義) ended in a "religion of humanity" (「콘트」, II.5 p. 87). ↩
  43. The printed date 一九三八 "1938" is wrong. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856–1931), 「프링글·패티슨」 (II.5 「푸링글·페티손」), published Man's Place in the Cosmos in 1897 (2nd ed. 1902); Jeong's Korean title is 「宇宙안에 있어서의 人間의 地位」. Whether the slip is Jeong's or the compositor's cannot be told, so the date stands as printed. 人間中心主義 "anthropocentrism." That Pringle-Pattison first used the term is Jeong's claim or his source's [Rall?]. ↩
  44. F. C. S. Schiller (1864–1937), 「쉴러」, the Oxford pragmatist, whose Humanism: Philosophical Essays appeared in 1903. ↩
  45. Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918). The name is printed 「월터、으라우쏜뿌쉬」, with a 、 between the two names and 으 for the initial R; the third syllable of the surname may be 쓴. The books are A Theology for the Social Gospel (1917), Jeong's 「社會福音의 理論」 "The Theory of the Social Gospel"; Christianity and the Social Crisis (1907), printed 「基督敎와社會的危機」; and The Social Principles of Jesus (1916), 「예수의 社會訓」 "The Social Teaching of Jesus." ↩
  46. Harry F. Ward (1873–1966), 「헤리워드」, of Union Theological Seminary and the Methodist Federation for Social Service, who is credited with drafting the Methodist Social Creed of 1908. 「敎會의 社會信經」 is The Social Creed of the Churches (1912), which Ward edited. 「聖經과 社會生活」 "The Bible and Social Life" and 「宗敎와 民本主義」 "Religion and Democracy" are not identified with certainty. 民本主義 "democracy" (Japanese minponshugi). ↩
  47. Printed 索[sic]制 for 牽制 "hold in check": the character is 索 (十 over 冖 over 糸), not 牽. ↩
  48. 實體 is "reality" throughout this passage (實體의 世界 "a world of reality," 實體의 總體 "the whole of reality"). 神의 實在 is "the reality of God," as in the title 神의 實在: it names God's being real, not God as a single being. So also 外界의 物自體의 實在 "the reality of things-in-themselves" (p. 123). 自己賦與의 行動 "act of self-giving" is Jeong's phrase for revelation from ch. 1 on. ↩
  49. 進究 "inquires," as printed, for the usual 硏究 or 探究; left unmarked. ↩
  50. Charles Francis Potter (1885–1962), 「포터」, founder of the First Humanist Society of New York (1929) and author of Humanism: A New Religion (1930); Jeong calls him a Unitarian minister (「유니타리안」). Both quotations are translated from Jeong's Korean. He places the first on the book's first page and cites the second to p. 8, as printed: (Potter, C. F., Humanism, p. 8). ↩
  51. Edward Scribner Ames (1870–1958), 「애임쓰」 (II.2 n. 40). The distinction between "God," the absolute of the philosophers, and "the God of religion," found in the universality of values, is the argument of his Religion (1929) [Rall?]. ↩
  52. Ames, Religion (1929), cited as printed: "Ams[sic], E,S., Religion, p. 124". 實在들 "real beings": 實在 naming single beings takes "real being." 生命은 살며 움직이고 存在한다 "life lives and moves and has its being" echoes Acts 17:28. 交際 "fellowship." ↩
  53. 精神의 安定 "peace of mind." 精神 holds "spirit" and "mind" together; here the context leans to "mind" (cf. n. 4). ↩
  54. The bracket opened at 「이 세상에는 "In this world" is not closed in print; the English closes the quotation after "the living garment of God," where the borrowed words end. They are Goethe's, from the Earth Spirit's song in Faust I: "Geburt und Grab, / Ein ewiges Meer, / Ein wechselnd Weben, / Ein glühend Leben, / So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit / Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid." Jeong's intermediate source, perhaps Ames, is not identified. The English follows Jeong's Korean. ↩
  55. Printed 어렇[sic]게하연[sic] for 어떻게하면 "how": 렇 (with ㄹ) is set for 떻, and 연 (with ㅇ) for 면. ↩
  56. A. Eustace Haydon (1880–1975), 「헤이든」 (II.2 「헤이돈」), The Quest of the Ages (1929); Jeong's title 「時代의 疑題」 is "The Question of the Age." 疑題 "question." ↩
  57. 體驗 "lived experience," kept apart from 經驗 "experience." 重生 "regeneration," the new birth. ↩
  58. Albert C. Knudson (1873–1953), 「그늣손」 (II.5 n. 29). The source of his "cuttlefish philosophy" is not identified. The print closes a bracket after 가리우는것과 "and hides itself" but opens none; the English quotes the likeness from 오징어가 "like the cuttlefish" to that point. ↩
  59. Printed 自物體[sic] for 物自體 "thing-in-itself," the first two characters transposed; the next page prints 物自體 correctly. ↩
  60. Printed 實經論[?], clear in print but not a known word. "British empiricism" (經驗論, on the page before) is what the sense wants; 實證論 "positivism" is less likely. The English reads "empiricism." ↩
  61. 「純他」 "the wholly other," Otto's das ganz Andere, which Barth took up in the second edition of Der Römerbrief (1922). 超然的 "transcendent." 契機 "moment" (German Moment). 對像 "object," as printed (for 對象), is Jeong's form (as in Part II). ↩
  62. 歐洲大戰 "the European War," the First World War (1914–18). 「도스토우에스키」 Dostoevsky; 「기루게고아」 Kierkegaard, from the Japanese キルケゴール. Barth's debt to both shows in the second edition of Der Römerbrief. 「뿌루너」 (p. 123) is Emil Brunner. ↩
  63. Two quotations, neither attributed to a work: 「하느님의 말씀이 和解者로서 … 啓示한다。」 and 「이 恩寵의 世界에 … 한다。」. They read as a summary of Barth rather than as sentences of his that can be identified, perhaps taken from a secondary account in English or Japanese [Rall?]. 和解者 "reconciler"; 業의 義 "the righteousness of works" (German Werkgerechtigkeit). 義 holds together "righteousness" and "justice"; here the Reformation sense, "righteousness," is plainly meant. 實 "fruit." The syntax of the second quotation allows 反抗 to be the Spirit's own "resistance" to the human spirit; the English takes 反抗과 業의 義 as the pair that 即 ("that is") restates as the sin no thought or deed can remove. ↩
  64. 「바울」「루터」「허어만」: Paul, Luther and Wilhelm Herrmann (1846–1922), Barth's teacher at Marburg. 「허어만」 is a third form of the name, after 「윌헴 헤르만」 (Part I, ch. 2) and 윌리암·헤얼만 (p. 113). ↩
  65. The closing bracket after 決斷이라 has no opening one in print; the English opens the quotation where the definition begins. The images of faith as an empty space and a leap recall the second edition of Barth's Der Römerbrief (1922), where faith is a "hollow space" (Hohlraum); Jeong's source is not named [Rall?]. ↩
  66. 「信仰은 實質的으로 보자면 … 行爲이다。」 and 「生命的瞬間에 하느님의 말씀에 對한 人間의 應答」: unattributed. 知識 "knowledge," 認識 "recognition" (German Erkenntnis), 肯定 "affirming." 선물 "gift" is in Hangul. The line of thought (faith as acknowledgment of the Word, and as God's gift of the power to answer) is Barth's; the wording has not been traced [Rall?]. ↩
  67. 質的 差異 "a qualitative difference," Kierkegaard's phrase, which Barth made his own in the preface to the second edition of Der Römerbrief ("the infinite qualitative distinction" between time and eternity). 不可知論 "agnosticism." 機械的啓示論 "the theory of mechanical revelation," as 機械的啓示 in Part II, ch. 2 (n. 50): revelation as supernatural knowledge given once and kept unaltered. The chapter ends with this judgment. ↩

The 1939 text, transcribed as printed: one line per printed column, set vertically and read right to left. [sic] marks a printing error, corrected in the notes.

p. 一〇八, cols. 7–14
第三章 現代基督敎思想의 一般傾向 (一) 理性主義와 神秘主義 現代宗敎思想의 一般的 特徵은 主知主義에 對한 反動에 있다。그러나 過去 數世紀동안 基督敎는 啓蒙 思想의 進興에 依한 科學의 發達과 哲學의 再建으로 새로운 知的環境에 接觸할 때 吾不關然의 態度 를 取할수는 없었던것이다。十八世紀의 理性主義는 近代的精神이 宗敎의 領域에 있어서 最初의 큰 表 現을 본것이었다。 十八世紀의 理性主義는 一切의 外的權威에 立脚한 傳統의 拘束을 反抗하였다。이는 眞理의 標準이 敎 會의 決議나 傳承的인 敎義에 있는것이 아니요 사람의 理性的判斷에 있다고 主張하고 宗敎寬容과 自
p. 一〇九
由를 要求하였다。이는 한편으로 宗敎的紛議에 依한 敎會의 權威失墮와 또 한편으로 學的進步에 依한 人 間理性에의 信用이 促進된까닭이니 近代的精神의 優勢는 傳統神學에 重大한 波紋을 이르켰다。十七世 紀末葉 英國敎會가 羅馬加特力敎會와 分立하고 「宗敎寬容條令」을 國會에 通過시킨것은 改新敎와 그 根 本精神의 勝利를 意味한것이었다。그러나 本來「프로테스탄트」宗敎改革은 그 精神이나 內容에 있어서 中 世的인것이어서 羅馬加特力敎會와 같이 保守的이었으므로 理性의 權威와 自由의 認容은 當時 改新敎 에 있어서도 破壞的性質을 떠운것이었다。 둘째로 그들의 理性主義는 理性과 啓示를 調節하려고 努力하였다。「짠·틸레쓴」은 神秘主義의 情熱이나 「캠부리지플레토니슴」의 直觀器能과 같은것을 反對하고 宗敎의 眞理는 理性的證明에 依하야 確立되어야 할 것을 主張하였다。그리고 啓示는 自然宗敎의 不充分한 方面을 補充하야 自然宗敎의 義務를 確立한다고 생각하였다。그러므로 啓示는 自然宗敎의 原理와 矛盾되지 아니할것과 그것이 啓示라고 看做할만한 理由 가 確實하여야 한다는것이었다。「짠·락」은 神의 啓示가 우리의 理性으로 獲得할수 있는 知識을 줄수도 있 으나 이러한 境遇에는 啓示가 不必要할뿐 아니라 우리 自身의 槪念으로 熟慮하야 發見한 眞理는 傳統 的啓示에 依한 眞理보다 더 確實하다고까지 말하였다。그러나 그는 우리의 理性만으로서의 知識은 不 完全한것이요 理性 以上의 啓示가 必要한것을 力說하고 啓示는 다시 理性으로써 眞僞를 判定할수 있다 고 하였다。
p. 一一〇
셋째로 十八世紀의 理性主義는 大體로 人間에게 道德的能力이 있는것을 強調하고 宗敎의 根本目的이 道德的生活에 있는것을 主張하였다。「틴델」은 宗敎과[sic] 道德의 差異는 前者가 神의 意志라고 看做되는 條 理에 依하야 行動함에 對하야 後者는 그 自體에 있어서 생각되는 條理를 따라 行動하는데 있다고 하 였다。「칸트」는 自己의 義務를 神의 命令이라고 認定하는것이 宗敎라고 말한다。 神秘主義는 現代 여러가지 宗敎思想가운데 가장 顯殊한 潮流의 하나이다。「허멘」氏가「神秘主義의 意義 와 價値」에 「現代宗敎思想의 特色은 神秘主義의 復興에 있다」한 말이 아마도 事實에 가까운 觀察이 아닐가 생각한다。(Herman, A., The Meaning and Value of Wysticism[sic] p. 2) 現代에 이르러 宗敎的精神과 熱 誠을 가진 많은 사람들이 煩雜한 理論이나 形式에 흐르는 制度에 不滿을 품고 宗敎的神秘主義에 興 味를 傾注하고 있는것이 事實이다。 神秘主義는 첫째로 直接的經驗을 主要視한다。直接的驗經[sic]이란 神秘主義에 依하면 반드시 感情이나 直 覺을 意味하는것은 아니다。神秘的經驗에는 感情과 直覺이 있는 同時에 理知의 作用이있고 道德的活動 이 同伴한다。直接的經驗이란 말은 어느 學者가 말한것과 같이 「親知의 知識」을 얻는것이라고도 할수 있 을것이다。우리는 어떠한 對象에 對하여 觀察에 依한 叙述의 知識으로 만은 滿足하지 아니하고 對象 그것과 산 關係를 짓고 同情的인 態度를 가질수 있을 때에 비로소 그 對象에 對한 內的觀察이 可能하다。 둘째로 神秘主義는 唯物思想이나 形式主義를 反對하고 精神的인 內的世界를 憧憬한다。神秘主義는 우
p. 一一一
리의 靈的眞我가 實現되는 곳에 理想의 나라가 있다고 믿는다。우리는 大槪가 環境의 產物이오 環境 의 支配를 받는다。내앞에 어려운 일이 닥쳐올 때에는 나의 地盤이 흔들리고 때로는 世上을 詛呪하기 도 하고 때로는 周圍의 事情에 阿諛하려고 허덕인다。그러나 神秘主義는 環境이 바뀌고 周圍가 變 動할지라도 靈의 磐石 위에 永遠한 집을 짓고 나 自身이 내 精神의 主人公이 되어서 環境과 私慾을 支 配할것이라고 가르친다。그러므로 그들은 普通으로 物質의 世界를 輕視한다。萬一 物質과 肉體가 內 的生活의 究竟目的을 達成하는데 그길을 막는 障碍物이 될 때에는 차라리 物과 肉을 詛呪하기를 躊躇하 지 아니한다。特別히 現代 物質文明이 極度로 發達하고 모든것이 制度化하야 宗敎까지도 어느편으로는 우리의 所有慾을 채우려는 手段과 같이 看做되고 敎理와 儀式만이 屍體의 假裝과 같이 實生活을 떠나 騷亂스럽게 꾸미어 있을 때에 이와같은 神秘主義的反動이 必然的으로 일어나게 되는것이다。 마지막으로 宗敎的神秘主義는 무엇보다도 神의 現前을 意識하려고 努力한다。흔히 이르는바「神靈的 陶醉」란것이 곧 이것이다。勿論 神秘主義者들이 가지고 있는 神觀은 當者의 環境、敎育、感化等의 如 何를 따라 같지 아니하다。原始宗敎에 있어서 酒精이나 藥草를 飲用하고 亂舞律動的行動으로 接神의 方法을 삼거나 그렇지 아니하면 長時日을 두고 禁食、制慾、苦楚를 繼續하야 恍惚情態에 들어가려고 할 때에는 그들의 神觀도 原始的인 「마나」觀念外에 別로 的確한것이 없다。그러나 宗敎思想이 發達할쑤록 自然物을 崇拜對象으로 여기고 神 안에서 宇宙의 萬象이 統一을 얻는다고 믿게 된다。여기서 나아가
p. 一一二
우리가 崇拜하는 神이 人格性을 가질 때에 서로 喜憂와 目的을 같이하야 同情的親交를 맺게 된다。 基督敎神秘主義는「바울」과 「요한」의 思想에서 그 첫 싹을 볼수 있다。「바울」과 「요한」의 神秘思想은 全然 그들의 獨創에 依한것이 아니요 그 時代가 가지고 있던 思想形態를 取한것이 事實이다。그러나 「요한」에게 있어서 「로고스」와 「知慧」의 交叉나「바울」의 「그리스토、미스티시씀」과 같은것은 그들의 深奧한 內的體驗에서 얻은것이라 아니할수 없다。 初代基督敎會 宗敎思想은 大體로 보아서「新플래토哲學」의感化를 받은바 적지 아니하며 그들이 釋 義한 基督敎는「플래토的神秘主義」의傾向이 濃厚하다。 中世紀에 이르러 所謂 「完全神秘主義」의 基礎가 確立되고 基督敎는 極度로 神秘化하였다。이때의 神 秘主義者의 이름을 들자면「聖빙타의유고」(Hugo of St. Victar[sic], 1097—1141)、「클라르보의뻐나드」(Bernard of Clarvaux[sic] 1091—1153)、「아씨시의聖프랜시스」(Francis of Assisi, 1182—1226「제노아의캐터린」(Catherine of Ge- noa 1347—1380)「크로스의聖요한」(St. John of Crass[sic], 1542—1591)「쎈타떠라사」(Santa Therasa[sic], 1515—1582) 「앰구욘」(Mme Guyou[sic], 1648—1717)等이다。(Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystic Religion, Macmillan 叅照) 十八世紀 以後 獨逸改新敎가 頹廢에 기울어졌을 때에「필립·째곱·스페너」를 中心으로「敬虔의 渴仰」이 興起 하야 宗敎的精神을 皷舞한일이 있었다。그들은 信仰의 價値가 全然 實踐的効果에 依하여 決定되는것이 라 主張하며 宗敎의 理論的方面을 輕視하고 가장 單純하고 自由로운 信仰을 要求하야 個人의 敬虔을 强
p. 一一三
調하였다。그들은 宗敎生活에 直接影響을 주는 救濟信仰의 敎理에 中心하여 우리가 그리스도와 生命 的으로 融合하야 人格의 變化가 일어나야 할것을 力說하였다。 現代에 이르러 基督敎 안에서 神秘主義에 對한 研究가 더욱 熾烈하다。現代神秘論에 對한 主要한 文獻 을 紹介하자면 먼저는「띤·잉」敎授의「基督敎神秘主義」가있다。(Dean Inge, Christian Mysticism, 1899) 「잉」敎授는「플래토哲學」이 基督敎神秘主義의 眞髓라고 主張한다。이는「플래토닉·미스티시씀」이 基督敎의 根本 精神에 背馳된다고 說破하는 윌리암·헤얼만氏의「神秘論」(Herrmann, Wm., The Communion of Christian with God)과는 反對가 되는 見解일지나 이는 基督敎神秘主義研究의 代表作이라 아니할수 없다。哲學方面 으로는「하킹」敎授의 「人間經驗에 나타난 하느님」과 그의 弟子中 한 사람인「뻬네트」의「神秘主義의 哲 學的研究」가(Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience; Bennett, Philosophical Study of Mysticism)었[?]고 實 際方面으로는「쫀쓰」氏의「神秘宗敎의研究」(一九〇九)「十六世紀의靈的復興運動家들」(一九一四)「神秘宗敎에 對한 再考」(一九二七)等이 가장 顯殊하다。「쫀쓰」氏의 靈的生活에의 憧憬과 吟味는 科學에 陶醉하고 制度 에 얽매인 現代宗敎思想界에 큰 衝動을 주고 있다。그에 依하면 神秘經驗은 宗敎의 가장 銳利하고 强 烈하고 活氣있는 狀態이요(神秘主義의研究 緖言 十五頁)「神秘主義는 內的能力으로서 보이지 아니하는 靈 이 假象的이며 臨時的인 世界를 超越하여서 因果的이며 機械的世界를 征服하는 生活에의 主張이라고 한 다。(同上 二十二頁)「허멘」氏의「神秘主義의 意義와 價値」는 現代實用主義와 心理學 主義에 反對하여서
p. 一一四
宗敎的神秘主義의 要諦를 明確히하였다。哲學은 宗敎生活에 歷史的背景을 이루어있고 眞正한 宗敎는 純 正神秘經驗에 根據한다는것이 氏의 要點이다。이外에도 「언더힐」의 「神秘의道」「神秘主義의眞髓」같은 것이나「반휴겔」의 「神秘主義의 哲學」이나 「神秘主義의 超然神」等이 가장 留意할만한것이다。 (二) 根本主義와 現代主義 十九世紀 末葉 歐米의 神學思想은 흔히 根本主義와 現代主義의 兩陣으로 對立되어 있었다。 根本主義는 本來 制度나 敎理的인 觀念에 根據한다。羅馬加特力敎의 根本主義는 敎會 及 使徒的繼承 에 依한 敎職者의 特權에 置重하고 改新敎의 根本主義는 敎理와 聖經에 依據한다。그러나 그들의 根 本精神에 있어서는 둘이 다를것이 없다。 根本主義는 基督敎를 超自然的啓示라고 믿는다。即 基督敎는 어떠한 一定한 時期에 어떠한 一定한 場 所에서 오랫동안 감추어 있던 眞理가 前無後無한 事實로 한번만 特別한 神의 機關을 通하야 人間에게 顯 現한것으로서 이는 아무런 變動이나 遺失이 없이 保管되어 온것이라는 뜻이다。加特力敎會에 依하면 敎 會가 啓示의 保藏이 되고 改新敎에 依하면 聖經이 眞理의 保藏이라고 主張한다。啓示는 一回的인것이다。 啓示의 方法은 機械的이요 啓示의 本質은 固定的이다。여기에는 人間의 自然理性이 宗敎的眞理를 깨 달을수 없다는 人間墮落의 信念과 基督敎人이 된다는 말은 敎會 或은 聖經에 保藏한 啓示內容을 全的 으로 容認하여야 한다는 主知主義的見解와 基督敎의 一定한 傳統을 基督敎의「正統」思想이라고 固守하는
p. 一一五
歷史主義가 包含된다。어느때에는 이렇게 單純하고 具體的이요 超理性的인 啓示를 無條件하고 믿어야 할 理由가 一般民衆의 道德的義務를 激勵實行하게 하는데 있다고 主張하는 點으로 보아서는 正統을 方便으로 생각하는 傾向도 없지 아니하다。 現代主義는 或은 「新神學」이라고도 한다。「新神學」이란 述語는 「매킨토쉬」敎授가 처음으로 「으릇쉘 學派」를 指稱한 말이었는데 그후 차차 그 뜻이 變하여서 基督敎의 傳統을 反對하는 新學說을 指示하는 말이 되었다。그후로 여기에 여러가지 形容詞가 붙어서 「自由神學」 「現代神學」或은「進步神學」이라고 하야 根本主義者들이 이를 蛇蝎視하였다。 첫째로 現代主義는 偏見이 없는 態度를 가지고 宗敎事實을 對하고 참된 宗敎的眞理를 探索하고 追 求하기 위하여서는 現代의 모든 知識 即 自然科學이나 歷史學이나 心理學이나 社會學이나 哲學이나 倫理學이나 文學이나 審美學이 우리에게 주는 知識을 利用할수 있다고 主張한다。現代主義는 十八世 紀 英國의 自然神學者들과 같이 반드시 自然科學의 方法으로만 宗敎的眞理를 깨달을수 있다고 보지 아 니한다。이는 人間의 理性이 宗敎的眞理를 깨달을 能力이 있다는것과 人間이 成就한 가장 完全한 知 識이 있다면 이는 宗敎의 信仰과 矛盾 或은 反對되는것이 아닐것이라는 主見을 認定한다。 둘째로 現代主義는 生의 繼續的發展을 믿고 宗敎가 生의 一面인이만큼 亦是 固定的인것이 아니요 動的인것이어야 할것을 믿는다。宗敎는 神的權威에 根據하여야 한다。그러므로 참된 宗敎的眞理는 언제나
p. 一一六
啓示이오 참된 啓示에의 主張은 언제나 正統이다。그러나 人間의 經驗에 現示된 宗敎經驗은 언제 나 完全無缺한것이라 할수 없다。그러므로 그들은 神의 啓示가 人間의 歷史的發展과 文化生活의 變轉 을 따라 漸進的으로 現露한것이라고 믿는것이다。 셋째로 現代主義는 聖經과 敎理를 象徵的으로 解釋하려는 傾向를[sic] 가졌다고 말한다。理性으로 解決 을 짓기 어려운 記事는 모두 比喩나 寓話와 같이 생각하고 基督敎經驗의 實在의 藝術的表現이 곧 宗 敎形式이라고 主張하였다。 (三) 人本主義와 빨트神學 오늘날 宗敎的立場에서 二十世紀 文明을 全的으로 禮讚하는것이 있다면 이는 人本主義이다。最近 所謂 「新人本主義」란것은 現代文明의 精神을 그대로 理想化하고 宗敎化하려는것이다。 그러나 人本主義는 決코 二十世紀가 처음으로 創作한것이 아니다。人本主義가 現代의 產物이라고 하 기에는 너무나 悠久한 歷史를 가지고 있는것이다。勿論 現今에 所謂「新人本主義」或은「無神論的人本主義」 란것은 그 細目에 있어서 옛적 人本主義와 多少 區分되는 點이 없지 아니하나 우리가 지금이라도「新 人本主義」의 根本意義를 徹底하게 理解하려면 人本主義의 歷史的發展形態를 考究하는것보다 더 좋은 方法이 없다。 紀元前 五世紀에 希臘에 있어서「自然哲學에 對峙한 一部「소피스트」의 人本主義運動은 西洋哲學史上에
p. 一一七
異彩를 떠운것이었다。이前까지는 哲學이라면 物質의〓根本原素를 찾아내며 이 變轉無窮한 現象界에서 永 遠한 法則을 探索하고 雜多와 混沌의 世界에서 秩序와 系統의 宇宙를 追求하려는 一種의 廣漠한 思索 的哲學이었다。그러나 一部 哲學者들 中에는 이러한 廣漠한 理論에 倦怠를 느끼고 이는 有閑한 사 람의 놀음이요 効果없는 夢想에 不過한것을 깨달았다。여기서 그들은 哲學의 새로운 分野를 發見하 게 되었으니 이 새로운 分野는 곧 人間의 世界이었다。우리는 우리 스스로가 잘알고 또 實際生活 에 알아야만할 人間 그것을 對象으로 하여서 哲學的評價와 反省을 加하여야 한다。「쏘크라티스」가「너 를 알라」고 絕叫한것은 그 當時의 思潮에 있어서는 革命的인 말씀이었다。 그후 西洋思想史에 있어서 예수의 思想과 그로 말미암아 일어난 宗敎運動으로 因하야 가장 健全 한 意味에 있어서의 人道主義가 勃興하였으나 中世紀의 悠長한 暗黑의 그림자가 人間으로하여금 그 참된 價値를 認識하거나 發揮하지 못하게 만들어 주었다。그리다가 十五六世紀의 文藝復興時代가 왔다。 「으레니산스」의 精神은 中世紀의 敎會制度와 法王의 無道한 壓迫을 反抗하고 人間의 自由를 主張하고 封建制度를 打破하야 새로운 國家主義가 일어났고 科學의 知識은 날이 갈쑤록 自然을 征服하였고 新 大陸이 發見되어 새로운 希望을 가지고 人間의 理想的殿堂을 建設하려는 氣勢가 衝天하였다。여기서 그들은 敎會의 傳統的敎理를 反對하고 人間은 누구나 最大限度의 生의 기쁨을 누릴 權利와 機會가 있어야 한다는것을 强調하였다。
p. 一一八
第十八世紀 佛蘭西에 일어난 가장 顯殊한 人本主義的運動은 百科全書派의 活躍이었다。그들은 羅馬 加特力敎會의 制度가 極度로 腐敗하여 있는것을 指摘하고 敎會가 正義에 어그러진 社會制度를 擁護 하고 있다는것을 攻擊하였으며 大體로 敎會의 傳統神學을 反駁하고 無神論을 主張하는 편이 많았다。 그러나 그들의 無神論은 哲學的根據에 依한것이 아니요 社會의 改造와 人間의 價値及可能性을 强調하 기 위하여서의 無神論이었다。 最近에 이르러 米國을 中心하고 일어난 「新人本主義」를 理解하려면 먼저「오거스트·콘트」의 實證主 義에 依한 宗敎論을 考究하여야 한다。勿論「콘트」의 實證主義와 現代의「人本主義」는 그 體系形成의 場所、 時代 及 環境的情勢의 差異를 따라서 그 思想의 形態와 內容에 적지 아니한 區分이 섰다고 할것이나 現代科學의 方法과 原則을 그대로 宗敎에 適用하려고 하는데 있어서나 社會性과 社會的適應의 必要 를 力說하는것으로 보거나 理論보다도 現實生活의 具體的事實을 값있게 보는 點으로 보아서 本質的差 異가 없다고 할것이다。 神學上으로 본「新人本主義」는 그 歷史가 別로 길지 아니하다。所謂「新人本主義」란것이 생겨난것은 比較 的 最近의 일이라 할것이다。「프링글·패티슨」이 一九三八年에 「宇宙안에 있어서의 人間의 地位」를 쓰고 自 然主義와 對立되어 있는 「人間中心主義」를 말한것이 이 述語의 嚆矢가 아닐가 생각된다。그후 英國의 「쉴러」氏가 實用主義의 一部類로서의 「人本主義」를 말한것이 있었다。
p. 一一九
最近에 이르러 基督敎가 宗敎의 社會性과 社會的適應性을 强調하는 傾向이 있어 所謂「社會福音」의 必要를 誇張하였다。「월터、으라우쏜뿌쉬」의「社會福音의 理論」이라든가 「基督敎와社會的危機」라든가 「예 수의 社會訓」이라든가「헤리워드」의「聖經과 社會生活」、「宗敎와 民本主義」、「敎會의 社會信經」等은 벌 써 宗敎文獻의 古典이 되었으나 아직도 우리의 記憶에 새롭다。 그러나 우리가 여기에서 文化的人本主義와 神學的人本主義를 區分하여야 한다。神學的 人本主義는 한편 으로 傳統的宗敎思想을 排擊하고 또 한편으로는 極端에 흐르는 反宗敎思想과 運動을 索[sic]制하면서 말 하자면 半哲學 半宗敎、半社會科學이라고 할만한 特殊한 新宗敎의 提案이라 할것이다。 宗敎는 이 宇宙안에 있어서 宇宙를 超越한 實體의 世界가 있는것을 믿고 人間及 人間生活이 이 實 體와 密接한 生命的關係를 지어야 할것을 確信할것이다。그러나 宗敎는 이 實體의 總體를 完全히 다 알았 다고 誇言할 사람이 없다。누구나 宗敎家로서는 信實하고 謙遜한 마음으로 實體를 좀더 밝이 알고 좀더 密接한 關係를 맺어보려고 努力하는것이다。그러므로 우리는 實體의 世界를 알아야한다。宗敎家 가 擔負한 課題는 神의 存在가 宗敎에 絕對必要한 前提가 되는가 하는 問題보다도 우리는 어떠한 神을 믿을수가 있는가 하는데 있다。이 課題에 對하야 두가지 解答案이 提議되었다。하나는 神自身이 먼저 自 己賦與의 行動에 依하야 自己를 啓示한다는것이요 또 하나는 사람의 理性이 神의 實在와 本質을 認識 할수 있다는것이다。그러나 新人本主義는 以上 두가지 提案에 對하야 다 反對의 態度를 取한다。그들은
p. 一二〇
現代自然科學의 方法과 그 結果에 依한 知識이 아니면 妥當한 知識이 아니라는 自然主義的立場을 固守하 고 從來의 哲學的絕對에 對한 觀念이나 여기에 따라오는 啓示나 異蹟의 思想에 對하야 懷疑 或은 不可知의 態度를 取하고 있다。 「宗敎科學은 우리가 이미 아는 現象 即 人間의 宗敎經驗에서부터 시작하여서아직 알려지지아니한 領域을 向하야 進究한다。新宗敎科學은 神이 아직도 우리에게 알려지지 아니하였다는것을 認定한다。 事實로 우리가 당초에 宗敎科學이란것을 시작하려고 할 때에는 神의 課題에 對하여서는 懷疑的이여야 만 한다。」 이는 「유니타리안」의 牧師 「포터」氏가「人本主義」란 책 첫페이지에 말한것이다。그리고 그는 다시 이러케 말하였다。 「人本主義者는 이 科學의 時代에 있어서 論理的立場밖에 다른 길을 取할수 없다。그리하여서 우리는 神에 對하야 懷疑主義者이다。우리는 神이 있다고도 하지 아니하고 그렇다고 神이 없다고도 하지 아니한 다。우리는 神을 알수 없다고 말할뿐이다。」(Potter, C. F., Humanism, p. 8) 다시 말하자면 그는 宗敎科學의 方法論으로서의 懷疑的立場에서 學究의 出發을 삼는다는것보다도 神 을 懷疑境에 두고라도 或種의 信仰이 可能하고 宗敎가 成立되는것을 暗示한다。 그러나「애임쓰」敎授는 「神」과「宗敎의 神」을 區分한다。「神」即 哲學的絕對에 對하여서는 懷疑 或은
p. 一二一
拒否의 態度를 取할수 있으나 「宗敎의 神」은 科學的分析에 依하야 本體를 暴露할수 있다는것이다。 「애임쓰」敎授는 오늘날까지 宗敎에서 믿고 經驗하여온 「宗敎의 神」은 人間經驗에서 얻은 價値의 普 遍에서 發見할수 있다고 말한다。 「神은 生命을 가진 實在들이 사는 世界의 精神으로서 社會的이며 理想的인 經驗에서 引出한바이다。神 은 生命活動의 舞臺가 되며 存在의 條件이 되는 所謂 物質的世界를 包含하며 神은 生命과 理知와 行動 도 意味한다。神은 壯大한 總合인 生命의 過程으로 이 안에서 生命은 살며 움직이고 存在한다。사람은 여기에서 가장 適當한 生活을 營爲하여야 한다。그들은 여기서 讚頌으로 이를 노래하며 儀式으로 이 를 敬拜하며 精神으로 理想的 交際의 意識을 얻는다。神은 自己의 世界를 가장 深奧하고 가장 神靈 한 洞察努力에 依하야 理想化하고 人格化한것이다。」(Ams[sic], E,S., Religion, p. 124) 그렇기때문에 宗敎는 結局 人間生活을 더 完全하게 하려는데 中心한다。사람의 義務는 이 世上에 있다。 이 世上으로하여금 살만한 場所를 만들고 좀더 完全한 生을 누릴만한 環境을 짓는것이 宗敎의 根本 目的이라고 말한다。그러므로 宗敎는 何暇에 廣漠한 形而上學的問題를 가지고 씨름할수 없다。日後에 이러한 問題에 對한 解答을 얻을수 있을는지도 모르고 비록 解答을 얻지못한다 할지라도 宗敎에는 無關하다。 宗敎가 할일은 生의 安定을 얻도록 하는것이다。사람은 언제나 먹을것을 求하고 風雨를 避할만한 安 住所를 찾으며 集團의 安寧과 平和를 保全하려고 힘쓴다。사람은 意志의 自由를 求하고 精神의 安
p. 一二二
定을 바란다。「이 세상에는 사람의 能力으로 어이할수 없는 患難과 悲哀가 많음에도 不拘하고 誕生과 墳墓、永遠한 바다、變轉하는 人生、灼熱한 生命、이렇게 時間의 베틀 위에서 神의 살아있는 聖衣를 짜 고 있는것이다。어느때 旣成制度와 思想이 生의 理想에 圓滿한 滿足을 주지 못하는 境遇에는 우리는 모 든 過去를 全的으로 否認하고 새로운 進路를 開拓하려고 한다。사람은 生의 鬪場에서 이렇게 서로 웃 고 서로 즐기며 서로 慰勞하고 서로 배운다。이렇게 生의 기쁨을 누리는것이 人生의 特權이다。宗敎 는 무엇인가。宗敎의 形態는 時代의 環境을 따라 形形色色이나 그 根本目的은 한가지에 歸着된다。即 어렇[sic]게하연[sic] 좀더 잘 살겠느냐 하는것이다。現代보다도 이 目的을 達成하기에 適宜하고 緊切한 時代가 없 었다。우리에게는 옛사람이 所有하지 못하였던 科學的知識이 있다。豐饒한 物資가 있다。能率있는 機 械가있다。迅速한 交通機關이 있다。過去 人類의 經驗이 있다。여기에 生의 禮讚、激勵、能力이 되는 宗敎 가 必要하다。宗敎는 生의 最高發展을 위하야 努力하는것이 그 使命이다。이렇게 新人本主義는 主張한다。 그러므로 그들은 宗敎를 사람의 便宜대로 우리에게 効果를 많이 나타내도록 隨時變改할수 있다고 생각한다。「헤이든」氏의「時代의 疑題」는 宗敎가 歷史的機構에 따라 變遷한것을 指摘하고 生의 衝動이 時 代的形態를 取하야 宗敎的行動이 일어났다고 主張한다。말하자면 그는 人間慾望 自體의 本質과 妥當性 을 宗敎로 評價하려고 하지 아니하고 이는 宗敎 以前의것으로 認定한다음에 宗敎는 이 慾望을 得達하는 方法으로 看做하려는것이다。「新人本主義」는 언제나 効果를 주는 宗敎라는 觀念이 떠나지 아니한다。그
p. 一二三
들은 흔히 「時代的宗敎」라든가 「社會的宗敎」란 말을 잘 쓴다。「時代的宗敎」란 말은 宗敎가 時代의 產物 인이만큼 時代의 要求에 順應하여야 한다는 뜻이다。「社會的宗敎」란 말은 宗敎가 社會的精神의 一形態 인이만큼 社會의 福利를 위하야 實質的으로 貢獻하는바 있어야 한다는 말이다。여기에 米國 一流의 効 用論이 適用되어있다。新人本主義는 말하자면 宗敎的道具論이다。 新人本主義는 人間의 價値와 生의 榮光을 禮讚하였다。그러나 그 反面에 基督敎의 傳統이 가르치려는 가 장 重要한 道理를 버리게 되었다。이는 信賴와 敬畏의 生活、救贖의 恩惠에 對한 感激、驚異를 同伴하는 重生의 體驗을 알지 못하는것이다。 新人本主義는 自然主義的인 實際哲學에 土臺하고 實用主義的傾向을 떠우고 있다。그러나 여기에는 그 들이 詛呪하고있는 絕對論에 못하지 아니한 理論的窮地에 빠지고 말았다。그들은 「그늣손」氏가 말한것 과 같이 「오징어의 哲學」을 가지고 있다。新人本主義는 오징어가 敵을 만나면 검은 먹을 내어뿜어서 自己몸을 가리우는것과」 같이 文字의 迷雲으로 正體를 가리우려는것이라고 한다。 新人本主義에 正面으로 衝突되는 神學思潮中에 하나는 「빨트神學」이다。「빨트神學」은 最近世界宗敎思 想에 巨大한 衝動을 주고 있다。 「빨트」나 그의 學徒「뿌루너」는「칸트哲學」의 影響을 많이 받았다。十七世紀의 自然主義는 外界의 物의 獨 立的存在와 그 機械的法則에 興味를 가졌고 十八世紀의 經驗論은 外界의 自物體[sic]의 實在에 對한 認識可能
p. 一二四
에 懷疑하고 우리의 經驗內容인 印象과 觀念에 留意하였다。이때에「칸트」는 英國實經論[?]에 衝激을 받아 知 識獲得의 過程을 檢討하야 不可知의 物自體와 經驗 以前의 思考形式과 價値觀念에 依한 意味規定을 明 確히 하여주었다。「빨트」는 「칸트」의 二元論을 嚴正한 意味에 있어서 採擇하고 理想主義的一元論을 反對하여 「헤겔」의 辯證論의 修正에 依하야 이를 論證하려고 하였다。「헤겔」의 辨證法的發展階段은 切斷할수 없는 連續性을 가지고 있다。 그러나 「빨트」는 正反의 綜合이 있기 前 衝突의 背景이 되는 絕對發端에 眞理의 契機를 찾는다。그러 므로「빨트」에 依하면 神은 우리에게 알려지지 아니한 超然的인 創造主이다。神은 우리의 모든 存在와 行 動의 純粹發端에 있어서 一切 人間 乃至 人間的인것과 質的으로 區分되는「純他」라고 한다。그러므로 그는 神에 對한 知識을 다른 人智와 同一視하고 神을 知識의 一對像으로 하여 理論으로써 信仰을 證明 하려는 唯理的 正統神學을 否認하고 神은 神의 自己賦與의 行動에 依한 啓示가 아니면 그 뜻을 알수 없다고 말한다。 「빨트」의 神人의 二元的 對立思想은 人間의 地位와 價値에 對하여서도 福音主義的 見解에 還元시키려는것 이다。「빨트」는 人生의 有限性과 罪惡性을 가장 痛切히 느낀 사람이다。그는 現代文明의 象牙塔이 歐洲大 戰에 依하야 無慘하게 斷碎되는것을 目睹하고 人間의 하는 일이 얼마나 微微하고 無常한것을 깨달았다。 그에게는 「도스토우에스키」의 人生觀이나 「기루게고아」의 哲學이 異常한 魅力으로 衝動을 주었던것이다。
p. 一二五
여기에서 그는 恩寵의 世界를 남달리 深刻하게 깨달았다。「하느님의 말씀이 和解者로서 人間에게 臨하야 謙遜을 要求하고 또 사랑의 恩賜를 주는 權威로서 自己를 啓示한다。」「이 恩寵의 世界에 있 어서 和解者로서의 聖靈은 人間의 靈에 反抗과 業의 義 即 思想이나 行爲에 依하여서 除去할수 없 는 罪에 拮抗하며 聖靈에 依하야 信仰과 喜悅과 確信의 實로 나타내게 한다。」 고 말하였다。 以上에 말한바와 같이 超然神의 自己啓示에 依하야 救贖하시는 恩寵을 주심에 對하야 人間이 그 責任의 地位에 있어서 할일이 무엇인가。여기서「빨트」는 다시「바울」「루터」「허어만」의 思想系統을 踏襲하야 信仰은 그에 依하면 空虛한 空間을 채우는 意志이며 虛空을 向하여 나아가는 飛躍的 決斷이라」고 하였다。이는 信仰을 人間의 知的過程이라고 解釋하거나 或은 規定된 信條의 獨斷的 承認이라고 보는 主觀的見解에서 떠나 神의 恩寵에 對한 純被動的 應答의 形態로 理解하려는것이다。 「信仰은 實質的으 로 보자면 知識이요 認識이요 내게 말씀하신 하느님의 말씀을 肯定하는것이요 내가 그것을 받고 또 내 自身의것으로 하는 行爲이다。」 그러나 本質에 있어서 信仰은 「生命的瞬間에 하느님의 말씀 에 對한 人間의 應答」으로서 우리를 부르시고 同時에 여기에 應하는 힘을 우리에게 주시는 하느 님의 恩寵의 선물이라고 말한다。 「빨트」의 神學은 主觀的 相對論에서 宗敎를 救出하는 時代的 使命을 다하였다。이는 自我를 넘어서 志 向하고 自我를 神에게 맡겨 敬虔한 精神을 갖는것이 무엇보다도 必要한것을 强調하였다。그러나「빨
p. 一二六, cols. 2–3
트神學」은 神과 人間과의 質的 差異를 認定하고 거의 不可知論에 빠질수밖에 없는 理論的 窮境을 만 들었고 이러한 窮境을 克服하기 위하여서 機械的啓示論을 그대로 反覆할수밖에 없었다。