基督敎神學槪論 · Jeong Kyeong-ok Wroot Press · preview
宗敎의 本質 · 1939 edition, pp. 74–82

Chapter 4. The Essence of Religion

What is religion? We use the word "religion" all the time, and when we use it we think we know what religion is. But when we stop to ask what it is we call religion, an exact answer does not usually come readily. Many scholars have defined religion. One scholar even collected over a hundred definitions of religion, counting only those with the most distinctive specific differences.1 Yet of no definition, whatever it may be, can we say that it is so complete and flawless that it could never be changed or corrected. For religion is by its essence something hard to sum up simply in a definition of any fixed form.

First, religion has developed from the remote past to the present day in forms of every shape and color. So even under the same name2 of "religion" its thought, tendencies, institutions and activities are not uniform, and it is hard to point to a common feature that could take in all its forms. And even if we arrive at some comprehensive concept, it has the defect that, by an undue widening of its extension, it fails to make plain what is peculiar to religion in its essence. For example, the religion of primitive times and the developed religion of today differ in essence, and it is hard to take them in under one concept. Even p. 75 if we look only at existing religions, we can see that among religions of various forms there is opposition and contradiction even in the principles held to be most fundamental to what makes a religion. Buddhism holds to a thoroughgoing atheism, and Islam professes an absolutely single God. Confucianism is this-worldly, ethical and devoted to antiquity, while Hinduism is for the most part contemplative, mystical and world-renouncing. There is an autonomous Jainism,3 which aims at strict moral discipline, and on the other side a heteronomous Christianity, which centers on redemption by the grace of God. In other words, religions are of many kinds, and the kinds differ so widely from one another that it is hard to arrive at the concept of religion in the form of a simple definition.

Second, religion is hard to consider in strict separation from human life in general. Religion is not an individual, independent entity4 standing apart from the phenomena of life in general. It permeates our whole personality and is at work in the whole of our living. So religion is as broad as life is broad, and as life has many branches, so the fields in which religion is at work are complex. That is to say, religion is expressed and at work with the conditions of life as its concrete structure, so it cannot be understood in full without examining the activity of the whole personality and the content of the whole of culture. In the thought and life of primitive peoples, when myth and magic took up almost the whole of it, culture was entirely undifferentiated, and no clear line stood between religion and politics, education, ethics, art, the economy and the other fields of culture in general. Only today has religion come to fix the limits of its essence p. 76 and function as religion. But this does not mean that religion withdraws entirely from the fields of culture in general, and, as a monadic existence5 with no organic or functional connection with them, carries on a world by itself alone, shut up in a world of its own. Religion does, of course, have special "religious acts," such as the sacraments, doxology, prayer and worship. But from such "religious acts" it is hard to understand the essence of religion in its outward relations. Religion is life.6 When religion is life, all our thought and action becomes religious, and education, politics, art, the economy, anything at all can come to have religious meaning. So the expression of religion in these outward relations is complex and wide-ranging, and its concept is hard to define simply.

Last, the reason it is hard to define religion in a fixed form is that religion itself, which we would define, is never fixed, but ceaselessly flows and changes. Even if we regard religion as a set of doctrines or institutions with a historical tradition, it has gone through a process of some selection and adaptation over time, and it has been applied and interpreted differently according to knowledge and the state of society. To go a step further: when we think of religion as vital experience rather than as a fixed form, it is of a nature that must always be alive and moving and growing vigorously. So religion is not something to be settled once and for all, "it is thus," and it must not stop in the same state even for a moment. At times the conceptual definition of religion, or its reduction to a uniform form, ends by killing its creative life. Religion is like flowing water: it must always be moving, vigorously and freely. p. 77

Above, we have explained two or three reasons why the concept of religion is hard to define. But despite these difficulties, to fix the theoretical direction of our treatment of religion, we can point out its chief features, settle provisionally on a normative concept of religion, and suggest the standard of the highest religion. Here, before the normative definition of the concept of religion, there are first a few points to consider.

First, to understand the heart of religion, we cannot take as our standard only the motive and form in which religion first arose. If we try to make the crude thought or the unrefined rites7 of primitive religion the norm for judging the essence and value of the highest religion, this is no more than8 an attempt to sacrifice the qualities added at the developed stages and reduce religion to magic.

Second, true religion does not have as a necessary condition that great crowds follow it or that it has a long historical background. Even if the whole world welcomes a religion with both hands and raises its voice in praise, that is no ground for judging it true. On the contrary, true religious experience and life may be found where nothing catches the eye of the crowd,9 and where there are no elaborate institutions and rites. From of old, those who have stood on the way of truth have often borne the mockery of the many and the misunderstanding of their age, found joy in solitude and accepted persecution gladly. So, in one respect, compromise10 and honor are things forbidden to religion.

p. 78 Last, when we try to define the normative concept of religion, we must attend to the inner life itself rather than to religion's concrete forms of expression. When religion is studied from the standpoint of science, the aim is usually a comprehensive description of the outward forms in which it has been expressed, and the study cannot enter the hidden depths of its dynamic life. In this sense the position of Dilthey, who holds that life is to be understood through life, may be called a method that brings us nearer to the real in life.11

What, then, is religion? If we are to have a religion ourselves, what kind of religion must it be? Religion centers on the personal relation between God and human beings, that is, on spiritual experience. Ideas of God and interpretations of human nature differ from religion to religion; indeed it would be truer to say that they differ from person to person. Yet religion, taken broadly, can be embraced, however loosely, in the concept of a relation between God and human beings. Here the search for, and the longing after, the whole and absolute reality of the universe goes on; and, with the poignant12 sense of having lived through that reality in person, one comes to live a life of dependence, reverence, worship and obedience, in the most devout spirit.

First, then, religion involves13 a conscious effort to find, in the universe or in the setting of life, an object of reverence that stands above all things, to know it, and to work together with it. That is to say, it deals with the gravest question there is for human beings. It is the effort of human beings, fundamentally bound in their thought and life, to overcome the essential predicament of their humanity; and at the same time it is the work of seeking the ground of the universe and of human life in all things, fixing their meaning p. 79 and seeking a standard. So religion is not one proposal among others, to be admitted or rejected according to subjective taste or interest. It is the ultimate way that every human being ought to walk, or at least the earnest effort to find the ultimate way.

Accordingly, religion involves devout discipline and earnest effort. To search for the absolute reality that is the ground of the universe, or to keep up14 a personal relation with God, is no easy thing. It calls for the investment of one's whole life. Nothing of worth is done without toil, and religion least of all. It is a thing to which I must pour out and offer my breath, my strength, my wisdom, my possessions, my sincerity, my whole life. Many people think religion is the idler's speculative quick scheme, a shortcut through life. But if we cannot know the depth of life without labor, nor achieve anything of worth without sacrifice, how much more is this true of following the truth and seeking fellowship with God.

Third, religion involves a serious and truthful attitude toward life. Religion makes us see, when human life is lived rightly and truly, how rich and how deep it is. To entrust my whole self to the will of God and the purpose of the universe, to work with them and rejoice with them, to take part in the providence of the universe and engage in its creative activity: this gives weight to me and sets the worth of my life. Every act and movement has meaning and is a serious thing. Here unceasing self-examination goes on, and one receives the stimulus and encouragement to a meaningful and earnest life. So religion is not a passing p. 80 fit of feeling, nor blind conformity to social custom, nor the fabrication of a cold theory. In the religious life the mental activities of feeling, willing and thinking go together; but here feeling is purified, the will made firm and the intellect unified. Religion teaches that there must be "the effort of the drowning,"15 the sense that a life decayed and ruined must be rescued.

Fourth, the religious attitude necessarily brings about a certain special quality of life. In other words, religious experience is holy living itself. So the highest religious life will be the highest expression of the purest, most spotless moral consciousness and action. First of all, religion has taught that a life sunk in folly, weakness and defilement can be born again, and it has offered fitting means to bring this about. Here, in the past, the scattered personalities of many people have found a new16 unity and center; those who had lost their aim and wandered have found the right direction; and souls that groaned in disappointment, grief and anguish have gained hope and joy and come to live meaningful lives. In society, religion has first believed in the possibility of spiritual reconstruction and growth, has worked with all its strength for the creation of "the new humanity,"17 and has in fact contributed not a little.

We have listed above the points of fundamental significance for the fact of religious experience, and so tried to make plain the distinctive features of religion. The aim was to make clear the uniqueness by which the fact of religion can be told apart from facts other than religious ones, and to point out religion's "features of reality"18 and its functions. Now we shall analyze what factors p. 81 religion with these features is made of, and so make the essence of religion clear. Religion, seen in the state in which we experience it, can be analyzed into three factors: an external factor, a subjective factor and a transcendent factor.19

First, the external factor means the general forms in which religion is shown to us: the scriptures, church, creeds, rules and rites that the historical religions possess. Whenever a new lived experience arose, a fitting outward form was sought to express that emergent lived experience; and when some fixed, ready-made form hindered the free activity of the spirit, or was inadequate to express the spirit's wondrous experience, revolt against forms and institutions broke out. But this is not a denial of institution or form as such. Outward forms are always required, so that religion may understand the concrete circumstances of its age, give spiritual experience a fitting shape, and at the same time foster it.

Second, the subjective factor means the inner psychological phenomena in which religion is experienced and lived by us: faith, conversion, sanctification,20 obedience. Religious experience has, in essence, a heteronomy21 that cannot be explained as a compound of the mind's functions. Whether religious experience is taken as a partial act of some one part of the personality or as a total act, it implies the so-called "extinction of subjectivity": the self aims beyond itself and submits itself to what it aims at. Yet although faith is not in essence psychological, it is experienced through the subject, and so the concepts of human action and human possession cannot be excluded. Mr. Hoashi analyzes the psychological basis of religion p. 82 under four heads: first, the functions of intellect, feeling and will, each in its proper measure, work in harmony toward the ideals and purposes of the whole person; second, from the standpoint of God, the great spiritual real being, one's view of value is overturned and new spiritual values are produced; third, what is newly real is discovered or created; fourth, the self is realized and passes through a process of self-creation (Hoashi Riichirō, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 283ff.).22 These items are the subjective results by which religion affects human life, directly or indirectly, and they are factors without which religion cannot be constituted.

Last, the transcendent factor of religion means the act in which God reveals himself for humanity, gives himself and asserts himself: that is, revelation and grace. Because our being and activity depend on the one God, the basic factor of religion is this: that our thought turns first to contemplate the God who is of himself and works of himself;23 that it recognizes that infinite good abides in God; that in our need it senses his presence with dread and wonder;24 and that it believes that all value rests on the good will of God, who creates and provides.

Notes

  1. Jeong does not name the scholar. The usual example is James H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion (1912), whose appendix sets out definitions of religion; it lists forty-eight, not "over a hundred" [verify]. 種差 is the logician's "specific difference" (differentia, from Part I ch. 3), and 顯殊 "distinctive" is Jeong's word (II.2 n. 15). [Rall?] for the paragraph. ↩
  2. 各[sic]目, for 名目 "name, title": the top of the character is 夂 (各), not 夕 (名). 같은 宗敎란 名目 is "the same name 'religion'"; 各目 "each item" makes no sense in the phrase. ↩
  3. 「자인」敎, "Jainism." 自律的 "autonomous" and 他律的 "heteronomous" are Kant's terms, here set against each other as moral self-discipline and redemption by grace. ↩
  4. 個別的獨立의 實體, "an individual, independent entity." 實體 is "reality" and "entity" in faculty-psychology contexts. This sentence belongs with those contexts: it denies that religion is a separate department of the mind (compare II.2 n. 21 on 心的實體 "mental entity"), and the next sentence says it permeates the whole personality. ↩
  5. 單子的存在, "a monadic existence": 單子 is Leibniz's monad (II.2, p. 54, 「라입니쯔」), the unit that "has no windows." 然이나 如斯한 ("but such") in the next sentence but one is literary Sino-Korean, unusual in Jeong's prose. ↩
  6. 宗敎는 生活이다, "Religion is life": the sentence of Part I ch. 4 (ch4 n. 11), where 生活 is concrete life. Here it opens the claim that anything at all, education, politics, art, the economy, can have religious meaning. In the paragraph before, 生의 幅 "the breadth of life" and 生의 줄기 "the branches of life" use bare 生, life as such. ↩
  7. 未練한, "unrefined": 未練 in Korean and Japanese usually means "lingering attachment" or (Korean 미련) "foolish." Here it pairs with 粗野한 "crude," in the sense of 未鍊 "untrained, unrefined." 練 and 鍊 alternate in Jeong (訓練/訓鍊), so no mark. ↩
  8. 지내지 아니한다, "is no more than": a period form of 지나지 아니한다, which Part I ch. 1 prints. First occurrence; no mark. ↩
  9. 群衆의 眼目에 떠우지 아니하고, "where nothing catches the eye of the crowd": 떠우지 for 띄우지 (or 뜨이지), "be seen, catch the eye." 떠 is clear. The same ㅓ for ㅢ/ㅣ appears in 떠운 (II.2 n. 53, from 띠다 "bear") and 떠우고 (II.5 n. 19): Jeong's spelling, no mark. ↩
  10. 安[sic]協, for 妥協 "compromise": the top of the character is 宀 (安), not 爫 (妥). 安協 is not a word; 妥協 pairs with 榮譽 "honor" as the things forbidden to religion. ↩
  11. 「데이루타이」, "Dilthey": Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), in the Japanese form ディルタイ. 生은 生으로써 理解할것 "life is to be understood through life" is his principle that life must be understood from itself (das Leben aus ihm selbst verstehen). Jeong gives no source. 生命의 實在 is rendered "the real in life" (實在 "the real"). [Rall?] for the paragraph. ↩
  12. 悲痛한 實感, "the poignant sense": 悲痛 is usually "grief, anguish," and it is clear in print. Jeong seems to mean an experience so intense that it hurts; the English keeps the edge of the word rather than smoothing it to "vivid." In the same sentence, 가장 敬虔한 精神으로 "in the most devout spirit" is the chapter's first 精神: the word holds "spirit" and "mind" together, and the English takes "spirit," since the phrase names the temper of the whole person at worship. Later in the chapter, 精神的으로 改造 (p. 80) is "spiritual reconstruction" in the same sense. ↩
  13. 努力이 包含한다, "involves... effort": the printed particle is 이, where 包含한다 "includes" would take 을. It recurs on p. 79 (訓練과 眞摯한 努力이 包含한다), so it is Jeong's construction, not a slip: no mark. The three marks of religion that begin here (첫째로, p. 78; 셋째로, p. 79; the second is unnumbered, 따라서 on p. 79) may follow an English source [Rall?]. ↩
  14. 支[sic]續, for 持續 "continue, keep up": 支 and 持 are both read ji. The same slip is marked in the Creed, art. 62 (creed n. 17). ↩
  15. 「溺死者의 努力」, "the effort of the drowning": in Jeong's brackets, as a quotation or a set phrase; the source is not traced [verify]. The sentence before names the three classical faculties, 느끼고 뜻하고 생각하는 "feeling, willing and thinking." [Rall?] for the paragraph. ↩
  16. 새로운, "new": printed correctly. In this typeface ㅅ and ㅈ are easily confused at small sizes, and every such reading in this edition was measured. ↩
  17. 「新人間」, "the new humanity": in Jeong's brackets. The phrase echoes the Pauline "new man" (Eph 2:15; 4:24; Col 3:10), which Korean Bibles give as 새 사람. Jeong wrote for the journal 『새사람』 (II.1 n. 6). ↩
  18. 「實體的特質」, "features of reality": in Jeong's brackets. 實體的 is the adjective of 實體, "reality"; the context is not faculty psychology, so "entity," kept for passages that treat the mind as separate faculties (n. 4), does not apply. Jeong means the features that make religion a reality of its own, not a by-product of something else, which is what the preceding sentence, on religion's 獨自性 "uniqueness," says. English has no adjective for "reality" that does not mean "actual" or "genuine," so the phrase is kept with its noun. ↩
  19. 外部的 · 主觀的 · 超然的 要因, "external · subjective · transcendent factor." 超然的 "standing apart, aloof" is not 超越 "transcend" (creed); it names what comes from beyond the human side, defined below as revelation and grace. The threefold analysis, with its list of creeds, rites and institutions, reads like an English outline of the elements of religion [Rall?]. ↩
  20. 聖潔, "sanctification": the chapter's first 聖潔. Jeong holds the work of sanctifying and the state of holiness together; here, in a list of things that happen in the believer (faith, conversion, obedience), the English takes the process, "sanctification." ↩
  21. 他律性, "heteronomy": the noun of 他律的 "heteronomous". Jeong means that religious experience is governed from outside the self, as the next sentence explains, and so cannot be reduced to the interplay of the mind's own functions. As on p. 75 (n. 3), where Christianity is the "heteronomous" religion of redemption by grace, the word carries no reproach. ↩
  22. 帆足理一郎 Hoashi Riichirō (1881–1963), philosopher at Waseda, who wrote on philosophy of religion and translated Dewey. 『宗敎哲學槪論』 is cited by title and page only; edition and date not traced [verify]. The four heads are summarized from his pp. 283ff. In the second, 神인 精神的 大實在 "God, the great spiritual real being" takes 實在 as "real being," since it names God; 精神的 is "spiritual" as in n. 12. In the third, 新實在 "what is newly real" keeps 實在 as "the real". In the first, 合宜한 機能 is "functions... each in its proper measure": 合宜 "fitting, suitable." ↩
  23. 스스로 계시고 스스로 일하시는 하느님, "the God who is of himself and works of himself": the language of divine aseity, perhaps echoing Exod 3:14 and John 5:17 ("My Father is working still"). The chapter's first 하느님; until here Jeong writes 神. ↩
  24. 畏怖와 驚歎, "dread and wonder": 畏怖 is "dread," from Otto's dämonische Scheu (II.2 n. 31), and the pair recalls Otto's tremendum and fascinans. The closing sentence, from "our thought turns first" to "who creates and provides," reads like a translated theological definition [Rall?]. ↩

The 1939 text, transcribed as printed: one line per printed column, set vertically and read right to left. [sic] marks a printing error, corrected in the notes.

p. 七四
第四章 宗敎의 本質 宗敎가 무엇인가。우리는 宗敎란 述語를 늘 쓴다。그리고 宗敎란 述語를 通用할때에는 宗敎가 무 엇인지 아는줄로 생각한다。그러나 무엇을 가리켜 宗敎라고 하는가 反省할 때에 正確한 對答이 얼핏 나오지 아니하는것이 普通이다。일찌기 學者들 사이에 宗敎를 定義한 사람이 많다。어떤 學者는 宗敎 의 定義를 가장 顯殊한 種差가 있는것으로만도 百種이 넘도록 蒐集하여 보기도 하였다。그러나 어 떠한 定義이든지를 勿論하고 그 定義가 다시는 變更할수 없다든가 修正하지 못하리만큼 完全無缺한 것이라고는 하기 어렵다。宗敎는 本質上으로 一定한 形式의 定義로 簡單히 槪括하기 어려운것이기때 문이다。 첫째로 宗敎는 悠久한 옛날부터 오늘날까지 形形色色의 雜多한 形態로 發展하여왔으므로 같은 宗 敎란 各[sic]目을 가지고라도 그 內容에 있어서 思想과 趣向과 制度와 活動이 不一하여 모든 形態를 다 包括할수 있는 共通點을 指摘하기 어렵고 비록 어떠한 槪括的인 槪念을 얻는다 할지라도 不當한 外延擴大에 依하야 宗敎의 特有한 本質을 明示하지 못하는 弊端이 있다。例를 들어서 말하자면 原 始時代의 宗敎와 現代 發達한 宗敎와는 本質上差異가 있어 同一한 槪念에 包括하기 어렵다。비록
p. 七五
現存한 宗敎로 볼지라도 여러가지 形態의 宗敎 사이에는 宗敎를 構成하는데 가장 根本的이라고 認定되 는 原理에 있어서라도 서로 反對와 矛盾을 이르키는것을 볼수 있다。佛敎는 徹頭徹尾한 無神論을 支 持하고 回回敎는 絕對唯一神을 信奉한다。儒敎는 現實的이며 倫理的이며 尙古的임에 反하야 印度敎는 大體가 瞑想的이며 神秘的이며 遁世的이다。嚴格한 道德的訓鍊을 目的하는 自律的인 「자인」敎가 있고 그 反面에 神의 恩寵에 依한 救贖을 中心삼는 他律的인 基督敎가 있다。換言하면 宗敎에는 種類가 많 고 그 種類를 따라 互相 差異가 懸隔하여서 簡單한 定義의 形式으로 宗敎의 槪念을 얻기 어렵다는 것이다。 둘째로 宗敎는 人間의 生活一般과 嚴密하게 區分하여서 考察하기 어렵다。宗敎는 一般 生活現象과 分立되어 있는 個別的獨立의 實體가 아니다。이는 우리의 人格全體에 滲透되어 있고 우리의 生活全 體에 作用되어 있는것이다。그러므로 生의 幅이 넓은이만큼 宗敎도 넓은것이요 生의 줄기가 많은이 만큼 宗敎가 作用되어 있는 方面도 複雜하다。말하자면 宗敎는 生의 諸條件을 具體的機構로 하여서 表現되고 作用되어 있으므로 宗敎는 人格 全體의 活動、文化 全體의 內容을 檢討하지 아니하면 圓滿히 理解할수 없다는것이다。原始人의 思想生活에 있어서 神話와 魔術이 거의 그 全部를 차지하고 있을 때에 는 그 文化가 全然 分化되지 아니한 樣態에서 宗敎와 政治、敎育、倫理、藝術、經濟、其他 一般 文化 領域과의 區分이 明白하게 서지 아니하였던것이었으나 오늘날에 이르러 비로소 宗敎는 宗敎로서의 本質
p. 七六
과 機能의 限界를 確定하게 되었다。그러나 이는 宗敎가 一般 文化領域에서 全然 離脫하야 單子的存在 로서 後者와는 아무런 有機的 乃至 機能的關聯이 없이 獨自世界 안에 封鎖되어 自體만으로서의 世界를 營爲한다는것이 아니다。勿論 宗敎에는 聖禮、頌榮、祈禱、禮拜와 같은 特殊한 「宗敎行爲」가 있다。 然이나 如斯한 「宗敎行爲」로서는 對外的關聯에 있어서의 宗敎本質을 理解하기에 困難하다。宗敎는 生 活이다。宗敎가 生活일때에 우리의 思想과 行動은 一切가 宗敎的인것이 되며 敎育、政治、藝術、經濟 무엇이나 다 宗敎的意義가 있는것이 될수 있다。그러므로 이러한 對外的關聯에 있어서의 宗敎의 表 示는 複雜 且 廣汎하여서 그 槪念을 單純하게 規定하기가 어렵다는것이다。 마지막으로 우리가 宗敎를 一定한 形式으로 定義하기 어려운 理由는 우리가 定義하려는 宗敎自體 가 常時 固定한것이 아니요 間斷이 없이 流動變遷하고 있다는것이다。비록 宗敎가 歷史的傳統을 가 진 一定한 敎條나 制度라고 본다 할지라도 時代를 따라서 若干의 取捨와 適應의 過程을 밟았으며 知識이나 社會의 情勢를 따라 이것을 活用하고 解釋하는것이 같지 아니하였다。一步를 나아가 宗 敎를 一定한 形式으로 보다도 生命的인 經驗이라고 생각할 때에 언제나 살아 움지기고 힘차게 자라 야만 할 性質의것이다。그러므로 宗敎는 이렇다고 한번에 作定하여 버릴것이 아니요 暫間이라도 같 은 狀態에 停止하여서는 아니될것이다。어느때는 宗敎의 槪念的規定이나 一律的形式化가 宗敎의 創作 的인 生命을 죽이고 만다。宗敎는 마치 흐르는 물과 같아서 언제나 힘차게 自由롭게 움지기고 있어
p. 七七
야만 한다。 以上에 우리는 宗敎의 槪念規定이 困難한 理由를 二三 說明하였다。그러나 이러한 難點이 있음에 도 不拘하고 宗敎에 對한 理論的方向을 確定하기 위하야 宗敎의 主要한 特徵을 指摘하고 宗敎의 規 範的槪念을 暫定하여 最高宗敎의 基準을 暗示할수 있을것이다。여기에 宗敎의 規範的 槪念規定을 앞두 고 먼저 몇가지 考慮하여야 할 點이 있다。 첫째로 宗敎의 眞髓를 理解하려면 宗敎가 맨 처음에 어떠한 動機와 形態로 起源하였다는것만을 가 지고 標準을 삼을수 없다。原始宗敎의 粗野한 思想이나 未練한 儀式으로서 最高宗敎의 本質과 價値를 判定하는 規範을 삼으려고 할진대 이는 發達된 階段에 附加된 特質을 犧牲하고 宗敎를 魔術에 還 元시키려는데 지내지 아니한다。 둘째로 참된 宗敎는 반드시 多數의 群衆이 追從한다든가 長久한 歷史的 背景을 가지고 있다는것 을 必須條件으로 하지는 아니한다。세상사람이 다 雙手로 歡迎하고 소리를 높여서 禮讚한다 할지라 도 그 理由로 그 宗敎가 眞理라고 斷定하지 못한다。오히려 群衆의 眼目에 떠우지 아니하고 煩多한 制度와 儀式을 所有하지 아니하였을지라도 그곳에 참된 宗敎的體驗과 生活이 있을수도 있는것이다。 自古로 眞理의 길에 선 사람은 무리의 嘲笑를 받고 時代의 誤解를 입어 孤獨을 즐기고 逼迫을 달게 받은 때가 많았다。그러므로 一面으로 보자면 安[sic]協과 榮譽는 宗敎의 禁物이다。
p. 七八
마지막으로 宗敎의 規範的槪念을 規定하려고 할 때에는 宗敎의 具體的인 表現形式에 보다도 內的生 活 自體에 留意하여야 한다。흔히 科學의 立場에서 宗敎를 考究할 때에는 그 表現된 外構의 形態의 綜 合的記述을 目的하고 그 動的인 生命의 秘境에 들어가지 못하게 된다。生은 生으로써 理解할것이라고 主張하는 「데이루타이」의 立場이 이러한 意味에 있어서 生命의 實在에 더 가깝게 하는 方法이라고 할수 있을것이다。 그러면 宗敎가 무엇인가。우리가 스스로 宗敎를 가진다면 어떠한 宗敎이라야 할가。宗敎는 하느님과 人間 사이의 人格的關係 即 靈的經驗을 中心으로 한다。하느님께 對한 觀念이나 人間의 本質에 對한 解 釋은 宗敎를 따라 不一하다。오히려 各各 사람을 따라 같지 아니하다고 하는것이 오히려 바른 말일 것이다。그러나 宗敎는 大體로 보아서 廣漠하나마 하느님과 사람과의 關係라는 槪念안에 包括할수 있 을것이다。여기에 全的이며 絕對的인 宇宙의 實體에 對한 探索과 仰慕가 繼續되고 그 實體를 親히 體 驗하였다는 悲痛한 實感을 얻어서 가장 敬虔한 精神으로 依賴、崇敬、禮拜、服從의 生活을 하게 된다。 그러므로 첫째로 宗敎는 宇宙 又는 生活環境에 있어서 모든것 위에 있는 崇敬의 對象을 찾고 이 를 알며 같이 同事하려고 하는 意識的努力이 包含한다。말하자면 人間에게 있어서 가장 重大한 問題 를 取扱하고 있는것이다。이는 思想과 生活에 根本的制約을 받고 있는 人間이 그 人間性의 本質的인 窮境을 克服하려고 하는 努力인 同時에 宇宙와 人生을 一切에 있어서 그 根據를 찾고 意義를 定하고
p. 七九
基準을 求하는 일이 된다。그렇기때문에 宗敎는 主觀的인 嗜好나 利害에 依하야 容認하거나 排斥할 수 있는 一提案이 아니다。이는 人間으로서 누구나 마땅히 밟아야 할 究竟의 길이요 적어도 究竟의 길 을 찾으려는 眞摯한 努力일것이다。 따라서 宗敎는 敬虔한 訓練과 眞摯한 努力이 包含한다。宇宙의 根據가 되는 絕對實體를 探索한다 든가 或은 하느님과 人格的인 關係를 支[sic]續하는것은 決코 容易한 일이 아니다。여기에는 生命 全體의 投資가 必要하다。무슨 일이나 값있는 일치고 힘들이지 아니하고 되는 일이 없다。그中에도 宗敎는 더욱 그러하다。이는 나의 呼吸、나의 能力、나의 知慧、나의 所有、나의 誠意、나의 生命 全體를 다 쏟아 바치지 아니하면 아니되는 일이다。宗敎는 生의 지름길을 걷는 怠慢者의 投機的速計라고 생각하는 사 람이 많다。그러나 勞苦가 없이 生의 깊이를 알지 못하고 犧牲이 없이 價値있는 일을 成就할수 없는 것이라면 眞理를 따르고 하느님과 사귀려고 하는 일은 더욱 그러할것이다。 셋째로 宗敎는 生에 對한 嚴肅하고 眞實한 態度를 包含한다。宗敎는 人生의 生活이 바로 살고 참 되게 살면 이것이 얼마나 豐饒하고 深奧한것임을 깨닫게 한다。하느님의 意志와 宇宙의 目的에 全 體를 맡기고 같이 일하며 함께 즐기고 宇宙의 攝理에 叅加하며 創造的活動에 從事하는것이 나를 무 겁게 만들고 나의 生活을 값있게 定한다。一擧一動이 다 뜻 있는것이요 嚴肅한 일이다。여기에서 間 斷없는 自己省察이 行하여지고 意味있는 眞摯한 生活에의 刺戟과 激勵를 받게 된다。그러므로 宗敎는 一
p. 八〇
時的인 感情의 發作이 아니요 社會慣習에 依한 盲目的 隨從도 아니요 冷情한 理論의 假作도 아니다。 宗敎生活에는 느끼고 뜻하고 생각하는 心的活動이 同伴한다。그러나 여기에서 感情은 淨化되고 意志 는 堅實하여지며 理知는 統一된다。宗敎는 衰頹廢滅한 生命이 救援을 받아야 한다는 「溺死者의 努力」 이 있어야 할것을 가르친다。 넷째로 宗敎的態度는 必然的으로 어떠한 特殊한 生의 質을 造成한다。換言하면 宗敎的經驗은 곧 거 룩한 生活自體이다。그러므로 가장 高尙한 宗敎生活은 가장 純潔無汚한 道德的意識과 活動의 最高表 現일것이다。먼저 宗敎는 愚昧하고 無力하고 汚瀆에 빠져 있는 生命이 再生할수 있다는것을 가르치 고 이것을 成就할만한 適當한 方法을 提供하였다。여기서 過去에 많은 사람의 分散되었던 人格이 새 로운 統一과 中心을 얻었고 目的을 잃고 彷徨하던 사람이 正確한 方向을 찾었으며 失望과 悲哀와 煩悶가운데 呻吟하던 靈들이 所望과 기쁨을 얻어 意味있는 生活을 하게 되었던것이다。社會上으로 宗敎는 먼저 精神的으로 改造 發展할 可能性을 믿고 「新人間」의 創設을 爲하야 盡力하고 實際로 貢 獻한바 적지 아니하다。 以上에 우리는 宗敎經驗事實에 對하야 根本的意味를 가지고 있는 重要點을 列擧하야 宗敎의 特質 을 明示하려고 하였다。이는 宗敎의 事實이 宗敎事實 以外에 다른 事實과 區分될수 있는 獨自性을 明 白히 하고 宗敎의 「實體的特質」과 그 機能을 指摘하려 함이었다。이제 이러한 特質을 가진 宗敎가 몇
p. 八一
가지 要因으로 構成되어 있는가를 分析하여 宗敎의 本質을 明白히 하려는것이다。宗敎는 우리에게 經驗되어지는 狀態로 보아서 外部的인 要因과 主觀的인 要因과 超然的인 要因의 세가지로 分析할수 있다。 첫째로 外部的인 要因은 宗敎가 우리에게 表示되는 一般形式을 이름이니 歷史的宗敎가 具有한 經 典、敎會、敎條、規例、儀式等이 이것이다。언제나 새로운 體驗이 있을 때에는 이 創發的인 體驗을 表示 하기 爲하야 여기에 適當한 外構的 形式을 求하였고 어떠한 一定한 旣成形式이 靈의 自由로운 活 動에 阻害되거나 靈의 神妙한 經驗을 表示하기에 不完全할 때에 形式과 制度에 對한 反抗이 일어났었 다。그러나 이는 制度나 形式 自體에의 否定이 아니다。宗敎가 時代의 具體的 事情을 理解하고 靈的 經驗을 適當하게 하는 同時에 또 이를 助長하기 위하야 언제나 外構的形式이 要求되는것이다。 둘째로 主觀的要因이라는것은 宗敎가 우리에게 經驗되고 生活하여지는바 內部的 心理現象을 이름이 니 信仰、回心、聖潔、服從等이 이것이다。宗敎經驗은 本質上으로 心理的諸機能의 合成으로는 解釋할수 없는 他律性이 있다。宗敎經驗은 人格性의 어떠한 一部分의 分割的行爲라고 보거나 或은 總合的行 爲이라고 보거나 여기에는 自我를 超越하여 志向하고 自我를 거기에 服從시키려는 所謂 「主觀性의 消滅」 이 暗示된다。그러나 信仰이 本質的으로 心理的인것은 아닐지라도 主觀을 通하여 經驗되는것이기 때 문에 人間의 行爲、人間의 所有란 槪念을 排除할수 없다。帆足氏는 宗敎의 心理學的基礎를 네가지 方
p. 八二
面으로 分析하여 첫째는 知情意의 合宜한 機能이 調和하여 全人的인 理想과 目的을 向하야 움지기 는것이요 둘째는 神인 精神的 大實在의 見地에서 그의 價値觀을 轉倒하여 새로운 靈的價値를 產出하는 것이요 셋째는 新實在를 發見하거나 또는 創造하는것이요 넷째는 自我를 實現하고 自己創造의 過程 을 밟는것이라고 한다。(帆足理一郎 宗敎哲學槪論、二八三頁 以下) 以上 諸項은 宗敎가 人間生活에 있 어서 直接 或은 間接으로 影響되는 主觀的 結果로서 宗敎를 構成하는데 있어서 없지 못할 要因이다。 마지막으로 宗敎의 超然的要因이란것은 神이 人間을 위하여 自己를 나타내고 自己를 주고 自己를 主張하는 行爲를 이름이니 곧 啓示와 恩寵이 이것이다。우리의 存在와 活動이 唯一한 하느님 안에 依 存되어 있기때문에 우리의 思念이 먼저 스스로 계시고 스스로 일하시는 하느님에 對한 凝視에 轉向 하야 하느님 안에 無限한 善이 常住하는것을 認識하고 우리의 窮乏가운데서 畏怖와 驚歎으로서 그 臨 在를 感得하며 一切의 價値가 하느님의 創造하시고 攝理하시는 善한 意志에 依한것임을 믿는 것이 宗敎의 基本的인 要因이 된다。