Part One: Theology
Chapter 4: The Purpose of Theology
p. 24 We have said that Christian theology consists in setting forth the content of Christianity and in understanding the truth of Christianity rightly and surely.1 This demands a comprehensive and systematic reflection on Christian truth. Here it is presupposed that Christianity is, before anything else, a life and a lived experience2 grounded in historical authority. This life, this lived experience, is what theology joins together, relates, and systematizes. We therefore hold that doctrine arises after there has been lived religious experience, and that theology comes after there has been religion. Christianity, so to speak, produces theology, and in turn p. 25 may be said to require theology.
First, Christian theology investigates the historical development of Christianity and its forms of thought.3 It seeks to understand the religious truth expressed in the life of faith of the saints and sages of old, in the dogmas of the body of believers, and in the institutions and rites of the church. When theology attends only to the forms that have appeared in history, its results easily become superficial; and while it honors tradition, it easily falls into an exclusive self-exaltation. Yet this study preserves the distinctive historical and social character of Christianity; it examines the process by which Christian thought has been expressed and has developed so as to meet the social structures and the demands of the age; and it enables us to view Christianity whole and in long perspective.
Second, Christian theology seeks to establish the basic theory of Christianity by the method of conceptual thought. By this we mean to hold a more just and more certain conviction. Generally speaking, even among people of considerable knowledge there are many whose understanding of religion is deficient. Even among Christians there are many whose faith has no sure theoretical ground. Most of them believe because others believe, and think it enough to say whatever others say. We must therefore digest Christianity with our own minds,4 and know surely why we believe, what we believe, and what comes of believing.
Third, Christian theology seeks to provide a dynamic standard for the Christian's life. Theology has often been misunderstood, as though it meant setting out vast5 theories or dry, tasteless doctrines. Some think theology is p. 26 the intellectual game of a very few scholars. But just as true theology is not established apart from the religious life, true religion requires a sound theology. There are many roads in the world, but the right road is hard to find. Theology seeks to show us a practical guide for life, so that we may walk the right road in the life of faith.
But can theology really achieve such a purpose?
What someone who first studies theology feels, before anything else, is not that theology solves our problems of faith. It is rather that theology brings about negative results: it raises many problems it cannot itself resolve, makes a once-simple head complicated, and goes so far as to destroy a once-peaceful foundation of faith. Because in theology what was vague becomes clear, foundations that were imperfect are shaken, and traditions that rested on misunderstanding are exposed, there will be many cases in which it brings negative results for the beginner. But only after dogmatism and blind obedience have been destroyed in this way can one strive, on a new foundation, toward an accurate understanding. Nothing worth harvesting is gained without effort. Faith requires intellectual training.
But what, down to the present, has theology actually done to make us understand the truth of Christianity? The purpose of establishing basic theory is good, but past theological effort seems, on the whole, to have left the impression that it manufactured "uncertain empty arguments and countless theories"6 and brought very little to a final conclusion. The Imitation of Christ praises p. 27 simple faith, and speaks of the meaninglessness of theological speculation as follows: "Even though you enter into profound argument about the Trinity, if you have no humility and so grieve the heart of the Three, what profit is there in that argument? Truly, it is not clever scholarly terms that make a person holy and righteous. Therefore I would rather be one who knows how to repent of sin than one who is skilled in definitions."7 The point is that theology has already written tens of thousands of books and fashioned clever terms, yet instead of resolving the problems of faith by them, each person has been busy making a theory of his own and each denomination has held a different creed, so that theology has rather fostered prejudice and hostility, and has gone so far as to commit cruel slaughter. (Uchimura Tatsuzō, trans., Imitāsho Kurisuchi, Book I, ch. 2.)8
Even if the merits and faults of theology lie in its complicating of simple faith, this is not confined to the domain of theology alone. When the natural environment or social phenomena are made objects of study, and precise observation and reflection are applied to them to "organize common sense,"9 theories arise and systems come to differ. Yet here too we can make clear why divergent theories arise, and can find unity in the manifold. In the same way, in theology too, we can recognize the historical place of its theories and dissenting views, and press on toward a new unity. Even supposing that theology down to the present has contributed little to us, if theological thought is itself a thing of value, we must press forward without the least hesitation. Pioneers make a greater contribution than the enterprises they accomplish, and heroes leave a greater merit than the results that meet the eye.10
p. 28 Religion is life.11 Life demands reflection. "A life without reflection is a life without worth."12 Without reflection one cannot get beyond the limits of common sense. Reflection may at first glance seem wasted labor, and it demands great sacrifice. But life is itself the subject of purposes, inclinations, and desires, and has reflection and choice as its marks; and even to determine the most effective and proper attitude toward the natural or social environment that surrounds it, life needs unceasing sifting and deliberation. Reflecting on the facts of religion may be as hard as making oil out of coal.13 But however hard and laborious, what must be done must be done. Restating and elaborating14 are unavoidable in fixing vague conceptual content. Our life of faith, in "pre-theological concepts," forms the material15 of theology. Theology therefore breaks up tradition that has had no criticism at all, and opens up the road16 until it reaches the final point of certainty.
Second, theology is not only a means of reflecting on the life of faith. Since the element of thought is contained in lived religious experience, thought itself becomes a principal part constituting faith. Thought is therefore one of the movements that give faith life.17 We said that the religious life comes first, and theology after it.18 But that statement described a logical order; it did not mean an order in lived experience. Speculative activity is not a method added onto religious faith from outside, or as an appendage. For thought is one of the factors that constitute faith. Without coming to know, lived religious experience is impossible; and without fixing a concrete direction, the value of religion p. 29 cannot be judged. Some will perhaps take the statement that there is an intellectual element in religious experience to be, on the contrary, hostile to faith. But this misunderstanding arises, for the most part, because the meaning of the term "knowledge"19 has not been precisely defined. If the word "knowledge" is used to mean assent to a fixed opinion or announcement, then "the intellectual element of religious experience" will also mean uncritical, silent acquiescence in doctrine, which is a kind of religious intellectualism.20 On the other hand, if the word "knowledge" refers to the results of natural science in its mechanistic aspect, or to metaphysical norms concerning pure ideas, then religion may have some relation to such knowledge, but that knowledge is not religion, and it is clearly distinguished from religious knowledge. But suppose we take the word "knowledge" in a broader sense, so that it includes first being conscious of something, or experiencing it, and then refers to a state in which the content is not a vague consciousness but has been concretely judged and distinguished. Then "the intellectual element of religious experience" means, first, that I am in a "state of awakening," aware that I have faith; and next, it indicates that the content of this experience can be distinguished with certainty. The very phrase "religious experience" already indicates a conscious phenomenon. Its conscious content must therefore be capable of being analyzed by the one who experiences it, and of being explained or asserted in some form or other. Here thought about religion becomes necessary.
Since reflecting on religion in this way is grounded in a characteristic of human nature, the theological effort that sets out from logical necessity rises to an attachment to, and even a passion for, religious truth. There is, so to speak, a kind of "artistic creativity" bound up with it. Human beings act at the same time as they seek to conceive. When their concepts are just, human beings act p. 30 according to the form of those concepts. Theology, therefore, does not mean to enjoy "the happiness of contemplation"21 by itself alone. The results of knowing are received into the life of value, and reality in turn is defined by the demands of value;22 and "doing theology"23 includes a passion to love the truth and to try to live by the truth. While we contemplate and search out religious truth, we come to realize how profound religion is, and how beautiful and rich its life is; and by this we receive the unceasing stimulus and encouragement of faith.
Notes
- "We have said": Jeong refers back to his definition in ch. 1, p. 3 (Christian theology "aims to set forth in a normative way" the religious truth contained in revelation, 規範的으로 闡明하는것) and to the close of ch. 2, p. 16 (to "set forth its shining truth"). 闡明 is "set forth," as in both places. ↩
- 生活이며 體驗. 生活 is "life" in the concrete sense of living. 體驗 is "(lived) experience," as distinct from 經驗 "experience". The chapter keeps the pair apart throughout: 宗敎的體驗 "lived religious experience" (pp. 24, 28), 體驗上順序 "an order in lived experience" (p. 28), but 宗敎經驗 "religious experience" and 經驗者 "the one who experiences it" (p. 29). ↩
- The three purposes that follow (historical study, conceptual theory, a standard for the Christian life) match the division Jeong made in ch. 1, p. 4, into historical, theoretical, and practical theology (歷史神學, 理論神學, 實踐神學). ↩
- 우리의 精神으로, "with our own minds." 精神: the word holds together English "spirit" and "mind" (German Geist; see ch. 2 n. 2, ch. 3 n. 10). The sentence is about digesting Christianity intellectually and knowing why and what we believe, so the English takes the side of "mind." "With our own spirit" would not be wrong, and Jeong means more than the intellect: the believer's whole inner life making the faith its own. ↩
- Printed 廣寞, for 廣漠 "vast, boundless". The two second characters are both read 막, and the compositor took the wrong one (寞 "lonely"). 廣漠 is printed correctly on p. 29. Marked [sic]. ↩
- 「不確定한 空論과 無數한 學說」, "uncertain empty arguments and countless theories." Jeong puts the phrase in quotation brackets without a source. It may be a quotation or only his scare-quotes; the sentence that follows introduces The Imitation of Christ, but the phrase is not from that passage. ↩
- The Imitation of Christ (Thomas à Kempis), Book I, ch. 1, sect. 3 in the usual division: "What does it profit you to dispute profoundly about the Trinity, if you lack humility and so displease the Trinity? … Truly, lofty words do not make a man holy and just … I would rather feel compunction than know how to define it." Translated here from Jeong's Korean, which has "grieve the heart of the Three" (三位의 마음을 괴롭게) and "one who knows how to repent of sin" (罪惡을 懺悔할줄 아는 사람) where the Latin has compunction. 義롭게 is "righteous" for Kempis's iustum. The Korean 義 holds together "righteous" and "just" (the dikaisune case itself); "holy and righteous" follows the devotional register of the passage. ↩
- The citation is printed as 內村達三譯 イミターショ・クリスチ 第一卷 第二章. Three points: (a) The translator is probably Uchimura Tatsusaburō (内村達三郎), brother of Uchimura Kanzō [verify the identification and the translation]. The book prints 達三 with no 郎, so the English gives the name as printed, "Uchimura Tatsuzō." Whether that is Jeong's shortening or a dropped character is not settled. (b) The katakana title, Imitāsho Kurisuchi, joins English "Imitation" to Latin "Christi." It is kept as printed; the Japanese edition and its date are not identified [verify]. (c) Jeong gives Book I, ch. 2; the passage is Book I, ch. 1 in the standard division. The Japanese edition may divide differently, or this may be a slip [verify]. The citation stands after Jeong's own summary ("The point is that theology has already written …"), but it belongs to the quotation. The summary is Jeong's, not Kempis's. ↩
- 「常識을 組織化」, "organize common sense." Jeong marks the phrase as a quotation. It echoes T. H. Huxley's definition of science as "trained and organized common sense" (On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences, 1854), widely repeated in English writing on science and religion. Jeong gives no source. ↩
- [Rall?] The closing maxim (pioneers give more than their enterprises achieve; heroes leave more than visible results) reads like a translated English aphorism. So does the whole defense of theology on pp. 26–27 (theology unsettles the beginner, but dogmatism must be broken before a new foundation; every science multiplies theories and still seeks unity). Check Rall first. ↩
- 宗敎는 生活이다。生活은 反省을 要求한다. 生活 is "life" here (concrete life, the life one lives), and the Socratic saying that follows needs "life." The next sentence but two changes the word: 生命은 그 自體가 … 主體로서, "life is itself the subject of purposes, inclinations, and desires," uses 生命, vital life, as a living subject. English has one word for both; the Korean moves from the life lived to the living thing that lives it. ↩
- 「反省이 없는 生活은 無價値한 生活이다。」, Socrates' "the unexamined life is not worth living" (Plato, Apology 38a). Jeong gives no source, and the Korean says "reflection," not "examination." Translated from the Korean. There is no full stop after the preceding 要求한다; the English begins a new sentence as the sense requires. ↩
- [Rall?] The simile "as hard as making oil out of coal" (coal liquefaction was a live industrial topic in the 1920s–30s) and the argument around it (life as a subject of purposes that must choose among its environment) sound like American functional psychology in Rall's register. Check Rall. ↩
- Printed 壽言追語. 壽 is clear, but 壽言 is no known compound, and the four-character phrase is not attested. The sense the sentence requires is "saying things over again and adding to them," laborious restatement, which is "unavoidable in fixing vague conceptual content." A likely misprint for a compound such as 重言 "repetition" (重 and 壽 share stacked horizontal strokes), but the intended word cannot be recovered with confidence. So it is transcribed without [sic], translated by the sense ("restating and elaborating"); the 삼원서원 edition may settle it. ↩
- 「神學以前의槪念」, "pre-theological concepts," Jeong's quotation brackets. 神學의 與材, "the material of theology": 與 is clear, but 與材 is not a word. The sense needs "material" or "data," so it is probably 素材 "raw material" or a slip toward Japanese 与件 (yoken, "the given, data"). Translated "material"; not marked [sic], because the intended form is uncertain. ↩
- 그 길을 開拓한다, "opens up the road." The first syllable is over-inked and could be read 결. 결 "grain, texture" gives no sense, while 길 "road" continues the chapter's image of the right road (p. 26). Read 길. ↩
- 信仰을 잘리는[sic] 運動: printed 잘리는 "being cut off," which gives no sense with 信仰을 as its object. Read 살리는 "that gives life to". ↩
- Referring back to p. 24: "doctrine arises after there has been lived religious experience, and … theology comes after there has been religion." Here Jeong limits that statement to logical order. ↩
- 知識이란 述語, "the term 'knowledge.'" 述語 is literally "predicate"; here it means simply the word or term. [Rall?] The analysis that follows, which distinguishes three senses of "knowledge" (assent to doctrine; scientific or metaphysical knowledge; awareness plus discrimination of content), is argued like Anglo-American philosophy of religion of the 1920s–30s (cf. Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, on the cognitive element in faith, cited in chs. 2 and 3). Check Baillie and Rall. ↩
- 宗敎的主知主義, "religious intellectualism": the view that faith consists in holding propositions. 沒批判的默從, "uncritical, silent acquiescence." Jeong's point is that on this definition "knowledge" in religion would be the very thing he rejected on p. 25 (believing because others believe). ↩
- 「冥想의 幸福」, "the happiness of contemplation," in Jeong's quotation brackets. The phrase recalls Aristotle's contemplative happiness (Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8), which Jeong sets against a theology that acts. No source is given. ↩
- 價値生活, "the life of value," and 實體 "reality,". The sentence is neo-Kantian in shape: knowledge is taken up into the life of value, and what counts as real is in turn fixed by the demands of value (cf. ch. 1 on 存在 "being" and 價値 "value"). ↩
- 「神學하는것」, "doing theology," the fixed rendering. ↩