基督敎神學槪論 · Jeong Kyeong-ok Wroot Press · preview
神學의 目的 · 1939 edition, pp. 24–30

Part One: Theology

Chapter 4: The Purpose of Theology

p. 24 We have said that Christian theology consists in setting forth the content of Christianity and in understanding the truth of Christianity rightly and surely.1 This demands a comprehensive and systematic reflection on Christian truth. Here it is presupposed that Christianity is, before anything else, a life and a lived experience2 grounded in historical authority. This life, this lived experience, is what theology joins together, relates, and systematizes. We therefore hold that doctrine arises after there has been lived religious experience, and that theology comes after there has been religion. Christianity, so to speak, produces theology, and in turn p. 25 may be said to require theology.

First, Christian theology investigates the historical development of Christianity and its forms of thought.3 It seeks to understand the religious truth expressed in the life of faith of the saints and sages of old, in the dogmas of the body of believers, and in the institutions and rites of the church. When theology attends only to the forms that have appeared in history, its results easily become superficial; and while it honors tradition, it easily falls into an exclusive self-exaltation. Yet this study preserves the distinctive historical and social character of Christianity; it examines the process by which Christian thought has been expressed and has developed so as to meet the social structures and the demands of the age; and it enables us to view Christianity whole and in long perspective.

Second, Christian theology seeks to establish the basic theory of Christianity by the method of conceptual thought. By this we mean to hold a more just and more certain conviction. Generally speaking, even among people of considerable knowledge there are many whose understanding of religion is deficient. Even among Christians there are many whose faith has no sure theoretical ground. Most of them believe because others believe, and think it enough to say whatever others say. We must therefore digest Christianity with our own minds,4 and know surely why we believe, what we believe, and what comes of believing.

Third, Christian theology seeks to provide a dynamic standard for the Christian's life. Theology has often been misunderstood, as though it meant setting out vast5 theories or dry, tasteless doctrines. Some think theology is p. 26 the intellectual game of a very few scholars. But just as true theology is not established apart from the religious life, true religion requires a sound theology. There are many roads in the world, but the right road is hard to find. Theology seeks to show us a practical guide for life, so that we may walk the right road in the life of faith.

But can theology really achieve such a purpose?

What someone who first studies theology feels, before anything else, is not that theology solves our problems of faith. It is rather that theology brings about negative results: it raises many problems it cannot itself resolve, makes a once-simple head complicated, and goes so far as to destroy a once-peaceful foundation of faith. Because in theology what was vague becomes clear, foundations that were imperfect are shaken, and traditions that rested on misunderstanding are exposed, there will be many cases in which it brings negative results for the beginner. But only after dogmatism and blind obedience have been destroyed in this way can one strive, on a new foundation, toward an accurate understanding. Nothing worth harvesting is gained without effort. Faith requires intellectual training.

But what, down to the present, has theology actually done to make us understand the truth of Christianity? The purpose of establishing basic theory is good, but past theological effort seems, on the whole, to have left the impression that it manufactured "uncertain empty arguments and countless theories"6 and brought very little to a final conclusion. The Imitation of Christ praises p. 27 simple faith, and speaks of the meaninglessness of theological speculation as follows: "Even though you enter into profound argument about the Trinity, if you have no humility and so grieve the heart of the Three, what profit is there in that argument? Truly, it is not clever scholarly terms that make a person holy and righteous. Therefore I would rather be one who knows how to repent of sin than one who is skilled in definitions."7 The point is that theology has already written tens of thousands of books and fashioned clever terms, yet instead of resolving the problems of faith by them, each person has been busy making a theory of his own and each denomination has held a different creed, so that theology has rather fostered prejudice and hostility, and has gone so far as to commit cruel slaughter. (Uchimura Tatsuzō, trans., Imitāsho Kurisuchi, Book I, ch. 2.)8

Even if the merits and faults of theology lie in its complicating of simple faith, this is not confined to the domain of theology alone. When the natural environment or social phenomena are made objects of study, and precise observation and reflection are applied to them to "organize common sense,"9 theories arise and systems come to differ. Yet here too we can make clear why divergent theories arise, and can find unity in the manifold. In the same way, in theology too, we can recognize the historical place of its theories and dissenting views, and press on toward a new unity. Even supposing that theology down to the present has contributed little to us, if theological thought is itself a thing of value, we must press forward without the least hesitation. Pioneers make a greater contribution than the enterprises they accomplish, and heroes leave a greater merit than the results that meet the eye.10

p. 28 Religion is life.11 Life demands reflection. "A life without reflection is a life without worth."12 Without reflection one cannot get beyond the limits of common sense. Reflection may at first glance seem wasted labor, and it demands great sacrifice. But life is itself the subject of purposes, inclinations, and desires, and has reflection and choice as its marks; and even to determine the most effective and proper attitude toward the natural or social environment that surrounds it, life needs unceasing sifting and deliberation. Reflecting on the facts of religion may be as hard as making oil out of coal.13 But however hard and laborious, what must be done must be done. Restating and elaborating14 are unavoidable in fixing vague conceptual content. Our life of faith, in "pre-theological concepts," forms the material15 of theology. Theology therefore breaks up tradition that has had no criticism at all, and opens up the road16 until it reaches the final point of certainty.

Second, theology is not only a means of reflecting on the life of faith. Since the element of thought is contained in lived religious experience, thought itself becomes a principal part constituting faith. Thought is therefore one of the movements that give faith life.17 We said that the religious life comes first, and theology after it.18 But that statement described a logical order; it did not mean an order in lived experience. Speculative activity is not a method added onto religious faith from outside, or as an appendage. For thought is one of the factors that constitute faith. Without coming to know, lived religious experience is impossible; and without fixing a concrete direction, the value of religion p. 29 cannot be judged. Some will perhaps take the statement that there is an intellectual element in religious experience to be, on the contrary, hostile to faith. But this misunderstanding arises, for the most part, because the meaning of the term "knowledge"19 has not been precisely defined. If the word "knowledge" is used to mean assent to a fixed opinion or announcement, then "the intellectual element of religious experience" will also mean uncritical, silent acquiescence in doctrine, which is a kind of religious intellectualism.20 On the other hand, if the word "knowledge" refers to the results of natural science in its mechanistic aspect, or to metaphysical norms concerning pure ideas, then religion may have some relation to such knowledge, but that knowledge is not religion, and it is clearly distinguished from religious knowledge. But suppose we take the word "knowledge" in a broader sense, so that it includes first being conscious of something, or experiencing it, and then refers to a state in which the content is not a vague consciousness but has been concretely judged and distinguished. Then "the intellectual element of religious experience" means, first, that I am in a "state of awakening," aware that I have faith; and next, it indicates that the content of this experience can be distinguished with certainty. The very phrase "religious experience" already indicates a conscious phenomenon. Its conscious content must therefore be capable of being analyzed by the one who experiences it, and of being explained or asserted in some form or other. Here thought about religion becomes necessary.

Since reflecting on religion in this way is grounded in a characteristic of human nature, the theological effort that sets out from logical necessity rises to an attachment to, and even a passion for, religious truth. There is, so to speak, a kind of "artistic creativity" bound up with it. Human beings act at the same time as they seek to conceive. When their concepts are just, human beings act p. 30 according to the form of those concepts. Theology, therefore, does not mean to enjoy "the happiness of contemplation"21 by itself alone. The results of knowing are received into the life of value, and reality in turn is defined by the demands of value;22 and "doing theology"23 includes a passion to love the truth and to try to live by the truth. While we contemplate and search out religious truth, we come to realize how profound religion is, and how beautiful and rich its life is; and by this we receive the unceasing stimulus and encouragement of faith.

Notes

  1. "We have said": Jeong refers back to his definition in ch. 1, p. 3 (Christian theology "aims to set forth in a normative way" the religious truth contained in revelation, 規範的으로 闡明하는것) and to the close of ch. 2, p. 16 (to "set forth its shining truth"). 闡明 is "set forth," as in both places.
  2. 生活이며 體驗. 生活 is "life" in the concrete sense of living. 體驗 is "(lived) experience," as distinct from 經驗 "experience". The chapter keeps the pair apart throughout: 宗敎的體驗 "lived religious experience" (pp. 24, 28), 體驗上順序 "an order in lived experience" (p. 28), but 宗敎經驗 "religious experience" and 經驗者 "the one who experiences it" (p. 29).
  3. The three purposes that follow (historical study, conceptual theory, a standard for the Christian life) match the division Jeong made in ch. 1, p. 4, into historical, theoretical, and practical theology (歷史神學, 理論神學, 實踐神學).
  4. 우리의 精神으로, "with our own minds." 精神: the word holds together English "spirit" and "mind" (German Geist; see ch. 2 n. 2, ch. 3 n. 10). The sentence is about digesting Christianity intellectually and knowing why and what we believe, so the English takes the side of "mind." "With our own spirit" would not be wrong, and Jeong means more than the intellect: the believer's whole inner life making the faith its own.
  5. Printed 廣寞, for 廣漠 "vast, boundless". The two second characters are both read 막, and the compositor took the wrong one (寞 "lonely"). 廣漠 is printed correctly on p. 29. Marked [sic].
  6. 「不確定한 空論과 無數한 學說」, "uncertain empty arguments and countless theories." Jeong puts the phrase in quotation brackets without a source. It may be a quotation or only his scare-quotes; the sentence that follows introduces The Imitation of Christ, but the phrase is not from that passage.
  7. The Imitation of Christ (Thomas à Kempis), Book I, ch. 1, sect. 3 in the usual division: "What does it profit you to dispute profoundly about the Trinity, if you lack humility and so displease the Trinity? … Truly, lofty words do not make a man holy and just … I would rather feel compunction than know how to define it." Translated here from Jeong's Korean, which has "grieve the heart of the Three" (三位의 마음을 괴롭게) and "one who knows how to repent of sin" (罪惡을 懺悔할줄 아는 사람) where the Latin has compunction. 義롭게 is "righteous" for Kempis's iustum. The Korean 義 holds together "righteous" and "just" (the dikaisune case itself); "holy and righteous" follows the devotional register of the passage.
  8. The citation is printed as 內村達三譯 イミターショ・クリスチ 第一卷 第二章. Three points: (a) The translator is probably Uchimura Tatsusaburō (内村達三郎), brother of Uchimura Kanzō [verify the identification and the translation]. The book prints 達三 with no 郎, so the English gives the name as printed, "Uchimura Tatsuzō." Whether that is Jeong's shortening or a dropped character is not settled. (b) The katakana title, Imitāsho Kurisuchi, joins English "Imitation" to Latin "Christi." It is kept as printed; the Japanese edition and its date are not identified [verify]. (c) Jeong gives Book I, ch. 2; the passage is Book I, ch. 1 in the standard division. The Japanese edition may divide differently, or this may be a slip [verify]. The citation stands after Jeong's own summary ("The point is that theology has already written …"), but it belongs to the quotation. The summary is Jeong's, not Kempis's.
  9. 「常識을 組織化」, "organize common sense." Jeong marks the phrase as a quotation. It echoes T. H. Huxley's definition of science as "trained and organized common sense" (On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences, 1854), widely repeated in English writing on science and religion. Jeong gives no source.
  10. [Rall?] The closing maxim (pioneers give more than their enterprises achieve; heroes leave more than visible results) reads like a translated English aphorism. So does the whole defense of theology on pp. 26–27 (theology unsettles the beginner, but dogmatism must be broken before a new foundation; every science multiplies theories and still seeks unity). Check Rall first.
  11. 宗敎는 生活이다。生活은 反省을 要求한다. 生活 is "life" here (concrete life, the life one lives), and the Socratic saying that follows needs "life." The next sentence but two changes the word: 生命은 그 自體가 … 主體로서, "life is itself the subject of purposes, inclinations, and desires," uses 生命, vital life, as a living subject. English has one word for both; the Korean moves from the life lived to the living thing that lives it.
  12. 「反省이 없는 生活은 無價値한 生活이다。」, Socrates' "the unexamined life is not worth living" (Plato, Apology 38a). Jeong gives no source, and the Korean says "reflection," not "examination." Translated from the Korean. There is no full stop after the preceding 要求한다; the English begins a new sentence as the sense requires.
  13. [Rall?] The simile "as hard as making oil out of coal" (coal liquefaction was a live industrial topic in the 1920s–30s) and the argument around it (life as a subject of purposes that must choose among its environment) sound like American functional psychology in Rall's register. Check Rall.
  14. Printed 壽言追語. 壽 is clear, but 壽言 is no known compound, and the four-character phrase is not attested. The sense the sentence requires is "saying things over again and adding to them," laborious restatement, which is "unavoidable in fixing vague conceptual content." A likely misprint for a compound such as 重言 "repetition" (重 and 壽 share stacked horizontal strokes), but the intended word cannot be recovered with confidence. So it is transcribed without [sic], translated by the sense ("restating and elaborating"); the 삼원서원 edition may settle it.
  15. 「神學以前의槪念」, "pre-theological concepts," Jeong's quotation brackets. 神學의 與材, "the material of theology": 與 is clear, but 與材 is not a word. The sense needs "material" or "data," so it is probably 素材 "raw material" or a slip toward Japanese 与件 (yoken, "the given, data"). Translated "material"; not marked [sic], because the intended form is uncertain.
  16. 그 길을 開拓한다, "opens up the road." The first syllable is over-inked and could be read 결. 결 "grain, texture" gives no sense, while 길 "road" continues the chapter's image of the right road (p. 26). Read 길.
  17. 信仰을 잘리는[sic] 運動: printed 잘리는 "being cut off," which gives no sense with 信仰을 as its object. Read 살리는 "that gives life to".
  18. Referring back to p. 24: "doctrine arises after there has been lived religious experience, and … theology comes after there has been religion." Here Jeong limits that statement to logical order.
  19. 知識이란 述語, "the term 'knowledge.'" 述語 is literally "predicate"; here it means simply the word or term. [Rall?] The analysis that follows, which distinguishes three senses of "knowledge" (assent to doctrine; scientific or metaphysical knowledge; awareness plus discrimination of content), is argued like Anglo-American philosophy of religion of the 1920s–30s (cf. Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, on the cognitive element in faith, cited in chs. 2 and 3). Check Baillie and Rall.
  20. 宗敎的主知主義, "religious intellectualism": the view that faith consists in holding propositions. 沒批判的默從, "uncritical, silent acquiescence." Jeong's point is that on this definition "knowledge" in religion would be the very thing he rejected on p. 25 (believing because others believe).
  21. 「冥想의 幸福」, "the happiness of contemplation," in Jeong's quotation brackets. The phrase recalls Aristotle's contemplative happiness (Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8), which Jeong sets against a theology that acts. No source is given.
  22. 價値生活, "the life of value," and 實體 "reality,". The sentence is neo-Kantian in shape: knowledge is taken up into the life of value, and what counts as real is in turn fixed by the demands of value (cf. ch. 1 on 存在 "being" and 價値 "value").
  23. 「神學하는것」, "doing theology," the fixed rendering.

The 1939 text, transcribed as printed: one line per printed column, set vertically and read right to left. [sic] marks a printing error, corrected in the notes.

p. 二四, from col. 9 (cols. 1–8 are the end of ch. 3)
第四章 神學의 目的 基督敎神學은 基督敎의 內容을 闡明하며 基督敎의 眞理를 正當하고 確實하게 理解하려는데 있다고 말하였다。이는 基督敎眞理의 綜合的이요 體系的인 省察을 要求한다。여기에 있어서 基督敎는 무엇보다 도 먼저 歷史的權威에 基礎한 生活이며 體驗인것을 前提로 한다。이 生活、이 體驗은 神學에 있어 서 結合되고 關聯되고 體系化하는것이다。그러므로 우리는 宗敎的體驗이 있은 다음에 敎理가 생기고 宗敎 가 있은 다음에 神學이 있다고 생각한다。말하자면 基督敎는 神學을 産出하고 또 다시 神學을 要
p. 二五
求한다고 할것이다。 먼저 基督敎神學은 基督敎의 歷史的發展과 思想形態를 考究한다。옛적 聖賢들의 信仰生活과 敎衆의 敎條나 敎會의 制度와 儀式에 表示된 宗敎的眞理를 理解하려는것이다。神學이 歷史에 나타난 形式에 만 着眼할 때에 그 結果가 皮相的이기 쉽고 傳統을 尊重히 여기는 동안에 排他的인 獨尊主義에 빠지기도 쉽다。그러나 基督敎의 獨特한 歷史的社會的性格을 保有하고 基督敎思想이 社會的機構와 時代의 要求 에 充足하도록 表現하며 發展하는 過程을 討究하며 基督敎를 全幅的으로 遠景的으로 觀察할수 있도 록 한다。 둘째로 基督敎神學은 槪念的思惟의 方式에 依하야 基督敎의 基礎理論을 確定하려고 한다。이로써 우 리는 좀더 正當하고 좀더 確實한 信念을 所有하자는것이다。一般的으로 보아서 相當한 知識을 가진 사람으로도 宗敎에 對한 理解가 不足한 사람이 많다。비록 基督敎人中에서라도 信仰의 理論的根據가 確實치 못한 사람이 많다。大槪는 다른 사람들이 믿으니까 나도 따라서 믿고 다른 사람이 말하는 대로 나도 그렇게 말하기만 하면 되는줄 생각하는 사람이 많다。그러므로 우리는 우리의 精神으로 基督敎를 消化하고 우리가 웨 믿고 무엇을 믿고 믿으면 어떻게 되는것을 確實히 알아야 할것이다。 셋째로 基督敎神學은 基督敎人의 生活에 動的인 標準을 提供하려고 한다。神學이라면 흔히 廣寞[sic]한 理論이나 乾燥無味한 敎理를 羅列하는것과 같은 誤解를 받아 왔다。神學은 極히 少數의 學者들의 知
p. 二六
的遊戱라고 생각하는 사람도 있다。그러나 참된 神學은 宗敎生活을 떠나서 樹立되지 아니하는것처럼 참다운 宗敎는 健全한 神學이 要求되는것이다。세상에는 길이 많다。그러나 바른 길을 찾기는 어렵 다。神學은 우리로하여금 信仰生活에 있어서 바른 길을 밟아 나아가도록 生의 實際的指針을 보 여 주려고 한다。 그러나 果然 神學이 이러한 目的을 達成할수가 있을가。 神學을 처음으로 배우는 사람으로서 먼저 느껴지는것은 神學이 우리의 信仰問題를 解決하여 준다 는것보다도 오히려 解決도 짓지 못할 여러가지 問題를 가지고 單純하였던 머리를 複雜하게 만들고 平 和스러웠던 信仰의 基礎를 破壞하는데까지 消極的인 結果를 이르키는것이다。神學은 曖昧하였던 點이 明確하여지고 不完全하였던 基礎가 흔들리고 誤解이었던 傳統이 暴露되므로 初學者에게는 消極的인 結 果를 이르키는 境遇도 많을것이나 이렇게 獨斷과 盲從이 破壞된 다음에 비로소 새로운 基礎 위에서 正確한 理解에 精進할수 있을것이다。努力이 없이 값있는 收穫을 얻지 못한다。信仰은 知的訓練이 要求 된다。 그러나 오늘날까지 神學이 實際로 우리에게 基督敎의 眞理를 理解하게 한것이 무엇인가。基礎理論 을 確定하려는 目的은 좋으나 過去의 神學的努力은 大槪「不確定한 空論과 無數한 學說」을 製造하여 내었고 最終의 結末을 지은것은 別로 없다는 印象을 준것 같다。「基督의 模倣」은 單純한 信仰을 禮
p. 二七
讚하고 神學的思辨의 無意味한것을 아래와같이 말하였다。「너희가 三位一體에 對한 深奧한 議論에 들 어간다 할지라도 너희에게 謙卑가 없어서 三位의 마음을 괴롭게 한다면 그 議論이 무슨 有益이 있는 가。實로 사람을 거룩하고 義롭게 만드는것은 巧妙한 學的術語가 아니다。그러므로 나는 定義에 能한 사 람이 되는것보다도 차라리 罪惡을 懺悔할줄 아는 사람이 되고싶다。」神學은 벌써 數萬의 책을 쓰고 巧 妙한 術語를 빚어내었을지라도 이로서 信仰의 問題가 解決되었다는것보다 사람마다 學說을 만들어내 기에 바쁘고 敎派마다 主張하는 信條가 달라 오히려 偏見과 敵對心을 길러주며 無慘한 殺戮을 敢 行하기까지 하였다는것이다。(內村達三譯 イミターショ・クリスチ 第一卷 第二章) 神學의 功罪가 單純한 信仰의 複雜化에 있다고 할지라도 이는 다만 神學의 領域에만 局限된것이 아니요 自然環境이나 社會現象이나 이것을 學研의 對象으로하고 精密한 觀察과 反省을 加하여 「常識을 組 織化」할 때에는 學說이 생겨나고 體系가 달라지기도 하나 여기서도 우리는 異說이 일어나는 所以를 밝히고 雜多 가운데서도 統一을 發見할수가 있는것과 같이 神學에 있어서도 學說과 異論에 對한 歷史 的地位를 認識하고 새로운 統一을 向하야 精進할수 있을것이다。비록 오늘날까지의 神學이 우리에게 貢獻한바 적다 假定하더라도 神學的思惟 그것이 價値있는 일이라면 少許도 躊躇할것 없이 힘써 나아 가야만 한다。先驅者는 그들이 成就한 事業보다도 더 큰 貢獻이 있고 英雄은 눈에 보이는 結果보 다도 더 큰 功績을 남긴다。
p. 二八
宗敎는 生活이다。生活은 反省을 要求한다 「反省이 없는 生活은 無價値한 生活이다。」反省이 없이 는 常識의 限界를 벗어나지 못한다。反省은 얼핏 보아서 徒勞인것 같고 巨大한 犧牲을 要求한다。그러 나 生命은 그 自體가 目的과 趣向과 慾望의 主體로서 反省과 選擇의 特徵을 具有할뿐 아니라 生命 을 둘러싼 自然 乃至 社會的인 環境에 對하야 가장 有効正當한 態度를 決定하기 위하여서라도 間斷 없는 取捨와 思慮가 必要한것이다。宗敎事實에 對한 省察은 石炭을 가지고 石油를 만드는것과 같이 어 려운 일일는지도 알수 없다。그러나 아무리 어렵고 힘이 들더라도 할일은 하여야만 한다。壽言追語 는 曖昧한 槪念內容을 確定하는데 不可避하다。우리의 信仰生活은 「神學以前의槪念」으로 神學의 與材를 形成한다。그러므로 神學은 아무런 批判이 없는 傳統을 粉碎하고 最後의 確實한 點에 이르도록 그 길을 開拓한다。 둘째로 神學은 信仰生活을 省察하는 手段일뿐 아니라 宗敎的體驗에 思惟의 要素가 包含되어 있다는 點으로 보아서 思惟 自體가 곧 信仰을 構成한 主要한 部分이 된다。그러므로 思惟는 信仰을 잘리는[sic] 運 動의 하나이다。우리는 宗敎生活이 먼저 있고 그 다음에 神學이 있다고 말하였다。그러나 이는 論理 的順序를 가르친 말이요 體驗上順序를 意味한것이 아니다。思索的活動은 宗敎信仰에 있어서 外來的으 로 或은 隨從的으로 附加된 方法이란 뜻이 아니다。思惟는 信仰을 構成하는 要因이 되기때문이다。 깨닫는다는것이 없이 宗敎的體驗이 不可能하고 具體的方向을 確定하지 아니하고 宗敎의 價値가 判定
p. 二九
되지 아니한다。宗敎經驗에 知的要素가 있다는 말이 오히려 反信仰的이라고 解釋할 사람도 있을것이다。 그러나 이러한 誤解는 大槪 知識이란 述語의 意義가 正確히 規定되지 아니한데서 이러난다。知識이란 말이 一定한 意見 或은 通告를 承認한다는 뜻으로 쓴다면 宗敎經驗의 知的要素란 말도 또한 宗敎 的主知主義의 一種인 敎義의 沒批判的默從을 意味한다。그리고 이 反面에 知識이란 말을 機械論的方 面에 依한 自然科學의 成果나 或은 純粹理念에 對한 形而上學的規範을 가르친 말이라면 宗敎가 이 러한 知識과 關係는 있을지 언정 이것이 宗敎가 아니요 이러한 知識은 宗敎的 知識과는 判然히 區分 된다。그러나 知識이란 말을 좀더 넓은 意味로 보아서 먼저는 무엇을 意識한다든가 經驗한다는 뜻이 包含하고 그 다음에는 이것이 廣漠한 意識인것보다도 그 內容이 具體的으로 判定하고 區分된 狀態를 가 르친다면 宗敎經驗의 知的要素란 말도 먼저는 내가 信仰을 가졌다는 「覺醒狀態」에 있다는것을 意味 하고 그 다음에 이 經驗의 內容이 確的히 區分될수 있는것을 指示한다。宗敎經驗이란 그 말 自體가 벌 써 意識的인 現象인것을 가르친다。그러므로 그 意識 內容은 經驗者 스스로가 分析할수 있고 어떠한 形 式으로든지 說明 或은 主張될수 있어야만 한다。여기에서 宗敎에 對한 思惟作用이 必要한것이다。 이렇게 宗敎를 省察하는것은 人間 性情의 特質에 根據하였으므로 論理的必要性에서 出發한 神學的努 力은 宗敎的眞理에 對한 愛着 乃至 熱情에까지 高揚된다。말하자면 여기에는 一種의 「藝術的創造性」이 附帶된다。人間은 槪念하려고 하는 同時에 行動한다。槪念이 正當할 때에 人間은 槪念의 形式에 依하
p. 三〇, five columns (the rest of the page is blank)
야 行動한다。그러므로 神學은 「冥想의 幸福」을 혼자서 맛보자는것이 아니다。認識의 結果가 價値生 活에 受容되고 다시 價値의 要求에 依하야 實體가 規定되는것이며 「神學하는것」은 곧 眞理를 사랑 하고 眞理를 따라서 살아보려는 熱情이 包含한다。우리가 宗敎的眞理를 冥想하고 探索하는 동안에 宗 敎가 얼마나 深奧하고 그 生活이 얼마나 아름다우며 豐饒한것을 깨닫게 되고 이로써 間斷이 없는 信 仰의 刺戟과 激勵를 받게 되는것이다。