基督敎神學槪論 · Jeong Kyeong-ok Wroot Press · preview
神學의 課題 · 1939 edition, pp. 9–16

Part One: Theology

Chapter 2: The Task of Theology

p. 9 Defining what the concept of theology contains is an extremely difficult thing to bring to a general understanding, because its systems are so drawn out and their connections of meaning so tangled. But we have said1 that, inasmuch as this is Christian theology, it is to be understood as an effort of spirit:2 one that takes the historical tradition of Christianity as its foundation and so preserves its own independent distinctiveness, adds to this a vital reflection shaped by the demands of reason3 and by the understanding of the age, and thereby seeks to supply our life of faith with a foundation, a standard, and a motive. The task of theology, we may suppose, must of course set out from this understanding.

In the course of its historical experience, Christianity has produced a great many differing theological systems, each setting its task differently. All these systems are traces of the one effort to understand the essence of Christianity, and whatever their objects or methods, a generous judgment is called for that grants they all share features common enough to fall within the domain of theology. Here we mean to look more deeply into the inner connection of these common features, to remove the friction that arises among the tasks the several systems take up, and, while granting each of their various forms its historical place, to make of all this our own synthetic task.

Christian theology began in the defense of Christian faith against the claims of the pagans. This called for reflection on the vital, lived experience that is fundamental to Christianity; but because the aim of that reflection lay in apologetics rather than in the systematic ordering of truth, there was some tendency to treat only those concepts that stood in opposition to pagan thought.4 p. 10 Justin, who may be called the representative figure of the educated class in the middle of the second century, maintained that among the philosophies Christianity is the true philosophy. He abandoned the traditional Jewish method of interpretation and held that his own change of thought had a historical continuity; yet he identified the claims of the Roman church5 with the true revelation of Christianity and labored to defend them. Clement of Alexandria said, "Whatever is necessary and profitable for human life comes from God, and philosophy especially is a covenant granted6 by God to the Greeks, a stepping-stone to the philosophy of Christ" (Ante-Nicene Library, 6.8).7 Origen too expressed agreement with this thought, and took the natural-theological premise that "Christianity acknowledges that it embraces the truth offered to all humankind and gained through faith."8 Yet taken as a whole, their thought held fast to the church's orthodox teaching and centered on Christian apologetics.

Medieval theology, as the science of dogma, was an instrument that existed to meet the needs of ecclesiastical government.9 The City of God of St. Augustine, the theologian of the transition, defended the absolute authority of the church's organization, rules, government, and articles of faith, and laid the foundation of Latin theology; and the Summa Theologica10 of Thomas Aquinas, the spokesman of scholastic theology, sought to set forth and defend the doctrine of the church, whose central themes are the fall of humanity and the redemption wrought by Christ.

The Reformers held that the central task of Christian theology lies not in the doctrine of the church but in Scripture. Scripture is the sole standard for our faith and life; the task of theology, therefore, is said to lie in the exposition of Scripture. In this way the objective authority over religious life moved from the church to Scripture, and the task of theology changed from doctrine to faith. p. 11 Melanchthon's Loci Communes11 and Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, though in practice they had not wholly abandoned the method of natural theology, were in principle attempts to hold fast to the exposition of Scripture, or to biblical thought.

But the distinguishing mark of modern theology is that it breaks through every heteronomous prescription, whether of doctrine or of Scripture, and seeks to locate the task of theology in the vital experience of faith. In this sense, as the book of Schleiermacher, who is called the father of modern theology, indicates, theology is "the science of faith" (Glaubenslehre). According to Schleiermacher,12 theology was to take religion itself as the central object of its inquiry, rather than being a branch of general philosophy or a discipline that expounds the doctrine of the church; and the religious phenomenon he took as his object was not grounded in heteronomous authority but set out from religious experience viewed from a psychological standpoint. He sought to rescue religion from its outward forms and relocate it in its original essence, and to move theology out of its condition as an instrument into the domain of pure science. Since then, modern theology has broken free of the objective and concrete authority handed down to it, and in an almost unregulated freedom has branched out in so many directions that one can scarcely find one's bearings.

Here Christian theology, commonly called "experimental theology" or "systematic theology" in England and America, and "dogmatic theology" or "dogmatics" in Europe, has striven to give a systematic assessment of the religious truth that Christianity contains.

p. 12 In recent times, as modern philosophy has developed on the one hand, and as understanding of religions other than Christianity has deepened on the other, a discipline called "Christian Evidences" arose, and before long it became "Apologetics." Generalized further, this expanded its field of inquiry into the "philosophy of religion," "comparative religion," and at last the "science of religion."4

How, then, are we to define the limits and the task of Christian theology?

Christian theology lies in assessing the ultimate truth of religion. It seeks to press on to the most comprehensive connections, in pursuit of one final, certain point. It is therefore bound by no particular construction; its domain belongs to the realm of the highest freedom of spirit. Judged not only by theology's method but by the very nature of truth, truth must be truth without difference, whatever the place, the time, or the denomination to which it belongs. The function of theology is to give expression to every form of lived experience by means of conceptual thought and to combine them, seeking an unchanging foundation amid what is relative and ever shifting, and to determine its ultimate value and meaning. But theology does not presuppose that universal truth must consist in blending together all the religions of the world, or in fabricating some abstract, universal concept. Religion is not an abstract concept that can exist apart from the forms in which it has been historically embodied. The task of theology, therefore, cannot disregard the distinctiveness of historical religion. Christian theology maintains that a true understanding of Christianity is itself the complete solution of life and the grasp of final truth. This is what is meant by the saying, "Whoever truly knows this religion knows every p. 13 true religion" ("Wer diese Religion Kennt, Kennt Alle." Quoted from Baillie, J., Interpretation of Religion, p. 121).13

Is Christian theology, then, to stop at describing the particular conceptions of Christianity, with their historical distinctiveness? Or is it to seek the material for defining an essential concept broadly, in the religions of the world and in the general religious thought of the present, and to aim at a "reconstruction of religion": an abstract unity that treats each individual religion as a repetition of a type? When Christian theology tries to build a system of thought on the basis of historical faith, that theology not only takes on a sectarian exclusiveness but comes to set up a separate standard of truth, different in essence from others. Conversely, when theology clings to the universality of religious thought in general in obedience to the demands of reason,3 it loses its interest in actual religion, relativizing everything absolute and naturalizing everything that astonishes. Theology, therefore, must lean to neither of these two extremes, and must discover a ground on which the two tendencies can be reconciled.

We must first remember that Christianity is a religion possessed of a historical character and historical structures. Yet in its claims of faith, Christianity does not think that it has been entrusted with only a share of religious truth; it holds itself to be the one ultimate truth for humanity. Christian theology, therefore, will preserve the distinctiveness of Christianity and honor the experiential embodiment of the truth revealed in it, the truth, that is, handed down as tradition.

Schleiermacher's theology, on the one hand, looked for the essence of religion in "the intuition of the universe" rather than in thought or action, and on the other sought the content of experience in historical faith as "the distinctive determination of feeling" (eigenthümliche abänderung).14 p. 14 His theology, accordingly, remained faithful to the end to the thought of German Protestantism. According to his position, "First, since theology is by nature a historical and descriptive science, its task is to report fully and in good order the articles of faith actually held; second, such a report must come from within, from one who is in a position actually to be their spokesman; and third, it must not go beyond the limits of the age or the church to which one belongs" (Baillie, J., The Interpretation of Religion, p. 54).15

Wilhelm Herrmann, well known as a disciple of Ritschl,16 likewise insisted that the task of Christian theology is not to discover or to fabricate some universal religion, but to labor at expounding the historical particularity of Christian faith.4 He maintains that apart from the truth of Christianity there is no true religious conviction and no true religious experience. The value of Christianity, he held, lies not in its containing some lofty thought found in no other religion, but in the distinct historical fact of Christianity itself: the fact that Jesus Christ is the revelation of God. He not only opposes a vague17 philosophical absolutism, but declares that even the knowledge of natural science has nothing whatever to do with religion. The task of theology, accordingly, is not to demonstrate the value or certainty of religion; it is, first, to make clear that religion has a character of its own, distinct from general knowledge such as philosophy or science; second, to set forth fully and rightly the particular essence and content of faith that Christianity possesses; and finally, to describe and report the historical doctrine of Christianity (Herrmann, Wm., Christian Communion with God (Eng. transl.), p. 15 3rd ed., pp. 61ff.).18

But there are many who maintain, on the contrary, that if we are to grasp the heart of religion, understanding only one particular religion or clinging only to subjective conviction cannot bring us to comprehensive truth, and makes even proper self-reflection impossible. If the scientific description of Christianity served only to supply material for a preparatory stage in defining the essential concept of religion, that would be another matter; but inasmuch as theology, seen as a normative science, aims at final and ultimate truth, it must investigate without remainder not only the general learning of humankind but the true treasures of all the world's religions, and seek out their unifying principle.

Long ago the Greek Stoic school, in a spirit of universal brotherhood, studied religious thought beyond the religious convictions to which they themselves belonged, and labored to adjust the traditional, received thought they had inherited to the wider horizon of a new environment. Especially after the Renaissance, inherited authority broke down on the one hand and religious thought gained its freedom, while on the other, under the influence of Romanticism, the ardor for classical studies grew fierce; and when, besides, the knowledge of philosophy in general and of science made astonishing, leaping advances, it is a fact that the bounds of Christian theology widened as well. Even if the task of theology itself did not change, Christian theology found itself confronted with all sorts of new problems and had no choice but to consider new methods.

What, then, should our attitude be? First, the Christian theologian, as one who learns religion, loves religion, and is zealous for religion, must not entertain self-satisfied notions or sectarian prejudice. p. 16 An attitude that, without a second thought, curses as heresy any idea one does not oneself believe or has not oneself understood is something to be most carefully avoided, whether judged by scholarly conscience or by the spirit of religion. This is by no means to say that one should be vague about one's own convictions and go along with19 the thought of others. The one who "does theology" must learn broadly and understand deeply the thought of any religion or any school, and take it into account. If one should discover that there is truth in a religion other than Christianity, this is no fact that wounds the truth of Christianity; one should rather rejoice in it, taking it as evidence that throws still more light on the truth Christianity possesses.

But to say that we must understand and take into account the various branches of learning and religious thought is not to say that we must believe in a syncretism gathered from a jumble of systems. If, within Christianity itself, it stands on a rational foundation that is exact and beyond doubt, and is grounded in an actual lived experience that does not waver, then this particular religion can itself become a unit of cosmic scope20 and the standard of true religion. Christian theology, therefore, we think, must first believe in the unique and absolute authority of Christian revelation, and then, borrowing the skills of every field of learning and the criticism of the age, set forth its shining truth.

Notes

  1. 理解할것이라고 말하였다, "we have said that it is to be understood." Jeong is referring back to ch. 1, where he defined theology as the systematic understanding of religious truth (p. 3) and gave it a practical aim (p. 8). The Sonnet draft dropped this clause and ran two sentences together.
  2. 精神的努力, "an effort of spirit." 精神: the word holds together what English divides between "spirit" and "mind." It is the usual East Asian rendering of German Geist, and like Geist it means the human spirit and intellect at once, not the Holy Spirit (聖靈). 精神的努力 could equally be "an intellectual effort." "Spirit" is chosen because the same sentence ties the effort to "vital reflection" and to the life of faith. The chapter's other occurrences lean the same way: "the highest freedom of spirit" (p. 12), "a spirit of universal brotherhood" (p. 15), and "the spirit of religion" (p. 16).
  3. 理念의 要求, "the demands of reason." Ruled 2026-09-15: 理念 renders "reason" where it names a faculty with demands or norms. Both occurrences in this chapter (pp. 9 and 13) are this sense.
  4. [Rall?], but check Baillie first. The whole survey reads like a condensed English-language account: the apologists, Clement and Origen, medieval theology as the church's instrument, the Reformers, Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Herrmann, and then the modern sequence "Christian Evidences" → apologetics → philosophy of religion → comparative religion → science of religion. Jeong names one English source twice: John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion (1928), pp. 54 and 121. Whether the survey itself follows Baillie is unverified. Compare Baillie's opening chapters with pp. 9–16 before turning to Rall (A Faith for Today, 1936, ch. 1). Baillie died in 1960, so the book may still be in copyright: cite it and quote briefly. This note is anchored at its three occurrences (pp. 9–10, 12, 14).
  5. 로마敎會, "the Roman church." This is an anachronism for Justin in the mid-second century, before there was a Roman church of the later institutional kind. It is probably Jeong's or his source's compression. Translated as printed.
  6. Printed 許諸, for 許諾 "grant, permit" (諸 has 者 on the right where 諾 has 若). Marked [sic] in the transcription.
  7. 言約, "covenant." The quotation is Clement, Stromata VI.8. Compare the Ante-Nicene Fathers translation (1885): "all things necessary and profitable for life came to us from God, and … philosophy more especially was given to the Greeks, as a covenant peculiar to them—being, as it is, a stepping-stone to the philosophy which is according to Christ." Jeong's 第六卷八 is therefore Book 6, chapter 8, not a volume and page; rendered "6.8." The Sonnet draft misread 言約 as 靑約 and treated it as a misprint.
  8. Printed without an opening 「. The quotation closes at 容認한다」고 하는, and it is assumed to open at 基督敎는. No source is given for Origen.
  9. 敎主政體, literally "religious-lord polity." Rendered "ecclesiastical government." It could be read more narrowly as hierocratic or papal government. Revisit if the word recurs.
  10. 神學大系, literally "the great system of theology," Jeong's title for Aquinas's Summa Theologica. Translated by the standard title.
  11. 神學原論, literally "fundamentals of theology," Jeong's title for Melanchthon's Loci Communes (1521). Translated by the standard title, as ch. 1 does with Calvin's Institutes.
  12. 「슐」氏, literally "Mr. Schl.", Jeong's abbreviation. The full name is spelled 「슐라이얼막헬」 in this chapter against 「슐라이얼마헬」 in ch. 1. That is a transliteration variant, not a misprint. 「信仰의 學」 (Glaubenslehre) is the customary short name for Der christliche Glaube (1821–22; 2nd ed. 1830–31).
  13. The German saying is almost certainly Adolf von Harnack's, from his 1901 rectoral address "Die Aufgabe der theologischen Fakultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte": "Wer diese Religion nicht kennt, kennt keine, und wer sie samt ihrer Geschichte kennt, kennt alle." Harnack was answering Max Müller's "wer eine kennt, kennt keine." Jeong takes it from Baillie, p. 121 [verify there]. Capitals as printed.
  14. 「宇宙의 直感」, "the intuition of the universe," is Schleiermacher's Anschauung des Universums (Über die Religion, 1799). 「感情의 獨自的決斷」 is translated from Jeong's Korean: 決斷 is "determination" or "decision." His German gloss abänderung means "modification." The German is left as printed (old spelling eigenthümliche, lower-case a); its source is not located and may be Baillie.
  15. This is Schleiermacher's position as reported by Baillie, p. 54. Its three points match Schleiermacher's definition of dogmatics as the science of the doctrine prevailing in a Christian church at a given time (cf. Der christliche Glaube §19) [verify in Baillie]. 敎宗, an unusual compound, is rendered "church" to fit that definition. Printed "Baille," marked [sic]. The Sonnet draft attributed this quotation to Herrmann; it is Schleiermacher's.
  16. Printed 「으릇쉴」, against 으릇첼 for Ritschl in ch. 1. Like the Schleiermacher spelling (n. 12), this is a transliteration variant, not marked [sic].
  17. Printed 廣寞, for 廣漠 "vast, vague." It is the same misprint as ch. 1, p. 8 (ch. 1 n. 18). Marked [sic].
  18. Herrmann's book appeared in English as The Communion of the Christian with God. Jeong's title is inexact and kept as printed.
  19. Printed 安協, for 妥協 "compromise." Marked [sic].
  20. 宇宙的單位, literally "a cosmic unit." Jeong's claim is that a particular religion, if rightly grounded, can itself be a whole of universal scope, and so answer the chapter's dilemma between historical particularity and universality.

The 1939 text, transcribed as printed: one line per printed column, set vertically and read right to left. [sic] marks a printing error, corrected in the notes.

p. 九, col. 2 onward (col. 1 is the end of ch. 1)
第二章 神學의 課題 神學槪念 內容의 規定은 그 體系의 悠長과 意味關聯의 煩雜으로 因하야 一般的理解에 到達하기 極難한 일이나 이것이 基督敎神學인 以上 基督敎의 歷史的傳統을 基礎로 하여서 그 獨立的인 特異性을 保存하고 여기에서 理念의 要求와 時代的理解에 依한 生命的反省을 加하고 이로서 우리의 信仰生活에 基礎、 標準、動因을 提供하려는 精神的努力인것으로 理解할것이라고 말하였다。神學의 課題는 勿論 이러한 理 解를 基調로 하여서 出發할것이라고 思慮된다。 基督敎는 歷史的經驗에 있어서 그 課題를 달리하는 幾多의 各異한 神學體系를 創作하였다。이 모든 體系는 오로지 基督敎의 本質을 理解하려는 努力의 자취로서 그 對象과 方法如何에 無關하고 다 神學의 領域에 包括할수 있는 共通된 特徵을 保有하였다고 容認하는 寬大한 處致가 企待된다。여기에서 우리는 이러한 共通된 特質의 內面的關聯을 더깊이 洞察하고 各體系가 取扱하려는 課題 사이에 일어나는 摩擦을 除去하고 各樣型式에 對한 歷史的地位를 認定하는 同時에 이로서 吾人의 綜合된 課題를 삼자는것이다。 基督敎神學은 異敎의 主張에 對한 基督敎信仰의 辯證에서 시작하였다、이는 基督敎의 根本인 生命
p. 一〇
的體驗에 對한 反省을 必要로 하는것이었으나 反省의 目的이 眞理의 系統보다도 護敎에 있으므로 異 敎思想과 對立的關係에 있는 槪念만이 取扱되는 傾向이 없시 아니하였다。第二世紀 中葉에 있어서 有 識階級의 代表人物이라고 할만한 「쩌스틴」은 基督敎를 哲學中에도 참된 哲學이라고 主張하야 유대人의 傳統的解釋方法을 버리고 自己의 思想轉向에는 歷史的系統이 있다고 생각하였으나 그는 로마敎會의 主 張을 基督敎의 참된 啓示와 同一視하고 이것을 辯護하기에 努力하였다。「알렉산드리아의 클레멘트」는 「무 엇이든지 人間生活에 必要하고 有益한것이면 神에게서 온것이요 特別히 哲學은 希臘人에게 許諸[sic]하신 神의 言約으로서 그리스도의 哲學에 이르는 階梯가 된다」(Ante-Nicene Library 第六卷八)고 하였고 「오리겐」도 이 思想에 贊意를 表하고 基督敎는 모든 人類에게 提供되고 信仰에 依하야 獲得한 眞理 를 包括한다는것을 容認한다」고 하는 自然神學的 前提를 取하였으나 그들의 思想은 總括的으로 보자면 敎會의 正統思想을 固守하고 基督辯證論을 中心한것이었다。 中世紀 神學은 敎義의 學으로서 敎主政體의 必要에 應하야 存在한 道具이었다。過渡期의 神學者 「聖오 거스틴」의 「神의 都」는 敎會의 組織、章程、管理、敎條에 對한 絕對權威를 擁護하여 라틴神學의 基礎를 새웠으며 스콜라 神學의 代辯者인 「도마스 액콰이나스」의 「神學大系」는 人間의 墮落과 基督의 救贖을 中心課題로 한 敎會의 敎義를 闡明하고 守護하려는것이었다。 宗敎改革者들은 基督敎神學의 中心課題가 敎會의 敎義에 있는것이 아니요 聖書에 있다고 생각하였
p. 一一
다。聖書는 우리의 信仰과 生活에 있어서 唯一한 標準이 된다。그러므로 神學의 任務는 聖書의 釋 義에 있다한다。이렇게 하여서 宗敎生活의 客觀的인 權威는 敎會에서 聖書로 移動하였고 神學의 課題는 敎 義에서 信仰으로 바뀌였다。「멜랭톤」의 「神學原論」이나 「칼빈」의 「基督敎綱要」는 비록 實際에 있어서 自然神 學의 方法을 全然 떠난것은 아니었으나 原則上으로는 聖書의 釋義 或은 聖書的思想에 執着하려고 한것이었다。 그러나 現代神學의 特徵은 그것이 敎義이거나 聖書이거나를 勿論하고 一切의 他律的인 規定을 打破하고 神學의 課題를 生命的인 信仰體驗에 두려는데 있다。이러한 意味에 있어서 現代神學의 鼻祖란 말을 듣는 「슐라이얼막헬」의 著書가 表示하는바와 같이 神學은 「信仰의 學」(Glaubenslehre)이다。「슐」氏에 依하면 神 學은 一般哲學의 一部門으로나 或은 敎會의 敎義를 闡明하는 學問으로 보다도 宗敎 自體를 硏究의 中心課題로 하려고 하였고 그가 課題삼으려는 宗敎現象이란것은 他律的인 權威에 基礎한것이 아니요 心理學的立場에 있어서 본 宗敎的經驗에서 出發한것이었다。그는 宗敎를 外構的인 形態에서 救出하야 本源的인 眞髓에 換 置하려고 하였고 神學을 道具的인 狀態에서 純粹한 學의 領域에 옮겨 놓으려는것이었다。그후 現代神學은 傳 來의 客觀的이요 具體的인 權威를 벗어나 거의 無統制의 自由가운데서 갈피를 잡을수 없으리만큼 多枝多葉으 로 發達하여 왔다。 여기에서 基督敎神學이 英米에서는 普通으로 「實驗神學」或은 「組織神學」이라 하고 歐羅巴에서는 「敎義神學」 或은 「敎理學」이라 하야 基督敎가 含蓄한 宗敎的眞理를 體系있게 評價하려고 努力하였다。
p. 一二
最近에 이르러 한편으로 現代哲學의 發達을 보게 되고 또 한편으로는 基督敎 아닌 다른 宗敎에 對한 理 解가 깊어감을 따라 「基督敎辯證論」(Christian Evidence)이란 學問이 생기고 이것이 얼마 되지 아니하 여서 「辯證學」(Apologetics)이 되었다。그리고 이것이 더 一般化하여서 「宗敎哲學」「比較宗敎學」 그리고 나중에는 「宗敎學」으로 硏究의 分野가 擴大되었다。 그러면 우리는 基督敎神學의 限界와 課題를 어떻게 規定하여야 할것인가。 基督敎神學은 宗敎의 窮極的眞理를 評價하는데 있다。이는 가장 包括的인 關聯에까지 나아가 最後의 確 實한 一點을 求하려고 한다。그러므로 이는 如何한 構成에 依하여서도 制約을 받지 아니한다。그 領域은 精神의 最高自由의 領域에 屬하였다。神學의 方法뿐만 아니라 眞理 自體의 本質로 보더라도 그것이 어느 곳에서나 어느 때나 어느 宗派에 屬하여 있든지 다를것이 없이 眞理일것이다。神學의 機能은 槪念的思 惟에 依하야 모든 形式의 體驗을 表現하고 結合하여 相對的이며 變轉流動하는데서 不變의 基礎를 求하 고 그 窮極인 價値와 意義를 決定하려고 한다。그러나 神學은 宇宙的인 眞理가 반드시 世界의 모든 宗敎 를 混合한다거나 어떠한 抽象的인 普遍槪念을 創作하는데 있다는것을 前提로 하지 아니한다。宗敎는 歷 史的으로 具現된 形態를 떠나서 存立할수 있는 抽象的槪念이 아닌것이다。그러므로 神學의 課題는 歷史的 宗敎의 獨自性을 無視할수 없다。基督敎神學은 基督敎에 對한 참된 理解가 곧 生의 完全한 解決이요 最 終的 眞理에의 把握이라고 主張하는것이다。「이 宗敎를 참으로 아는 사람이면 모든 참
p. 一三
된 宗敎를 다 아는 사람이라」고 말한것이 이뜻이다。("Wer diese Religion Kennt, Kennt Alle" Quoted from Baillie, J., Interpretation of Religion, p. 121) 그러면 基督敎神學은 歷史的特異性을 保有한 基督敎의 特殊槪念을 記述하는데 그칠것인가。或은 本 質的槪念 規定의 資料를 넓이 世界 諸宗敎와 現代의 一般宗敎思想에 求하야 個體宗敎를 類型反復으로한 抽象的統一의 「宗敎再建」을 目的할것인가。基督敎神學이 歷史的信仰에 根據하야 思想系統을 建設하려고 할 때에 그 神學은 黨派的排他性을 띨뿐 아니라 本質的으로 差異되는 個別의 眞理標準을 設定하게 되고 이와 反對로 神學이 理念의 要求에 依하야 宗敎思想 一般의 普遍性에 執着할 때에 神學은 實際的 宗敎的 興味를 喪失하야 모든 絕對的인것을 相對化하고 驚異的인것은 自然化하게 된다。그러므로 神學은 이 두가 지 極端中 아무데도 치우치지 아니하고 兩傾向을 調和할만한 根據를 發見하지 아니하면 안된다。 우리는 먼저 基督敎가 歷史的性格과 歷史的機構를 具有한 宗敎인것을 記憶하여야 한다。그러나 그 信仰 主張에 있어서는 基督敎는 宗敎的眞理의 一部分만을 나누어 맡았다고 생각하지 아니하고 이것이 곧 人間에 게 唯一한 窮極의 眞理라고 自處하는것이다。그러므로 基督敎神學은 基督敎의 獨自性을 保存하고 여기에 啓 示된바 말하자면 傳統으로 남겨진 眞理의 經驗的具現을 尊重할것이다。 「슐라이얼막헬」의 神學은 한편으로 宗敎의 本質을 思惟나 行爲에서 보다도 「宇宙의 直感」에서 찾았고 또 한편으로 經驗의 內容을 「感情의 獨自的決斷」(eigenthümliche abänderung)으로서의 歷史的信仰에서 求
p. 一四
하였다。따라서 그의 神學은 獨逸改新敎思想에 끝까지 忠實하였던것이다。그의 主張에 依하면 「첫째로 神學은 性質上으로 보아서 歷史的記述學이기 때문에 實際로 支持되는 信仰條例를 充實하고 秩序있게 報 道하는것을 任務로 할것이요 둘째로 이러한 報道는 內部로부터 自己 自身이 實際로 代辯者가 될만한 處地에 있어야 할것이요 셋째로는 自己가 屬하여 있는 時代나 敎宗의 限界를 벗어나서는 아니된다 는것이었다」(Baille[sic], J., The Interpretation of Religion, p. 54) 「으릇쉴」學徒로서 名聲이 높은 「윌헴」 헤르만」氏도 基督敎神學의 任務가 어떠한 普遍的宗敎를 發見하 거나 創作하라는것보다 基督敎信仰의 歷史的特殊性을 解說하기에 努力하여야 한다는것을 力說하였다。 그는 基督敎의 眞理를 떠나서 참된 宗敎信念이나 참된 宗敎經驗이 없다고 主張한다。基督敎의 價値는 다른 宗敎에서 찾어볼수 없는 高尙한 思想이 基督敎안에 含蓄되어 있다는데 있는것이 아니요 基督敎의 獨特한 歷史的事實 卽 예수 그리스도가 神의 啓示이라는 事實 自體에 있다고 생각하였다。그는 廣寞[sic]한 哲學的絕對論을 反對할뿐 아니라 自然科學의 知識까지도 宗敎에 아무런 關係가 없다고 說破한다。그러 므로 神學의 任務도 亦是 宗敎의 價値나 確實性을 論證하려는것이 아니요 첫째로 宗敎가 哲學이나 科學 과 같은 一般知識과 다른 獨特한 特性이 있다는것을 明確히 하고 둘째로 基督敎가 保有한 特殊한 本質과 信仰內容을 充實하고 正當하게 闡揚하며 마지막으로 基督敎의 歷史的敎理를 記述하고 報道하는데 있다 고 하였다。(Herrmann, Wm., Christian Communion with God, (Eng. transl.)
p. 一五
3rd ed., pp. 61ff) 그러나 이와 反對로 우리가 宗敎의 眞髓를 把握하려면 다만 한가지 特殊宗敎만을 理解하거나 主觀的確 信만을 固執하여서는 包括的인 眞理에 到達할수가 없고 正當한 自己反省까지도 不可能하다고 主張하는 사람이 많다。基督敎의 科學的記述이 宗敎의 本質槪念의 規定에 있어서 一準備階段으로서의 材料供給의 役割을 한다면 모르거니와 一種의 規範學으로 본 神學이 最終의 窮極的眞理를 目標로하는 以上 人類의 一般 學術은 勿論이요 世界 諸宗敎의 眞寶를 남김이 없이 考究하고 그 統一된 原理를 찾도록 하여야 한다는것이다。 일찌기 希臘의 스토익學派는 萬有兄弟主義의 精神을 가지고 自己가 屬하여 있는 宗敎信念 以外에 다 른 宗敎思想도 硏究하여서 自己들이 받은 傳統的인 旣成思想을 새로운 環境의 넓은 眼界에 調節하려고 힘썼던것이다。特別히 文藝復興 以後 한편으로는 傳來의 權威가 崩壞하여 宗敎思想에 自由를 얻게 되 고 또 한편으로는 浪漫主義의 影響을 받아 古典硏究의 熱이 熾烈하여졌고 그뿐만아니라 一般哲學이나 科學의 知識이 놀랄만한 飛躍的進步를 보게되자 基督敎神學의 限界도 넓어진것이 事實이요 비록 神學 의 課題에 變動이 없다 할지라도 基督敎神學은 여러가지 새로운 問題에 逢着하고 새로운 方法을 考慮 하지 아니하면 아니되도록 되었다。 여기에 있어서 우리의 態度는 어떠하여야 할가。첫째로 基督敎神學者는 宗敎를 배우고 宗敎들 사 랑하고 宗敎에 對한 熱誠을 가진 사람으로서 自滿自足한 생각이나 派別的인 偏見을 가져서는 아니
p. 一六
된다。自己가 믿지 아니하거나 自己가 깨닫지 못하는 思想이면 두말할것없이 異論이라고 詛呪하는것 과 같은 態度는 學者的良心으로 보거나 宗敎의 精神으로 보아서 깊이 삼가야 할일이다。이는 決코 自己의 主張에 어름어름하고 다른사람의 思想에 安協[sic]하도록 하라는 말이 아니다。「神學하는사람」은 어 떠한 宗敎나 어떠한 學派의 思想이나 넓이 배우고 깊이 理解하여서 이를 參考하여야 한다。萬一 基督敎 以 外에 다른 宗敎에서 眞理가 있는것을 發見하였다면 이는 基督敎의 眞理에 中傷되는 事實이 아니오 基督敎가 所有한 眞理를 더 밝히는 證據로 알고 오히려 기뻐할것이다。 그러나 우리가 여러가지 學術과 宗敎思想을 理解하고 參考하여야 한다는 말은 雜多한 體系를 蒐 集한 混合主義를 믿어야 한다는것은 아니다。基督敎 自體 안에 있어서 正確無疑한 合理的基礎 위에 서있 고 흔들리지 아니하는 實際體驗에 根據하여 있을진댄 이 特殊宗敎自體가 곧 宇宙的單位가 되어 참된 宗敎의 標準이 될수 있을것이다。그러므로 基督敎神學은 먼저 基督敎啓示의 獨自的絕對權威를 믿고 모 든 學術의 技巧와 時代의 批判을 빌어서 그 빛나는 眞理를 闡明할것이라고 생각한다。